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Translations of historical texts like The Clarion of Syria are labors 
of love, and perhaps literary betrayals, that bequeath valuable 
lessons for our present. In bringing Butrus al-Bustani’s bygone 
reflection on civil war to light, our first thanks go to Niels 
Hooper, executive editor at the University of California Press, 
for having recognized early on the contemporary significance of 
this project, and for having seen it go through many iterations 
to the end. We are also grateful for the insightful comments we 
received from the blind reviewers of the manuscript. May this 
publication lead to more translations of modern Arabic social 
and literary thought.
We are particularly excited about the fact that in addition to 
a hard copy, this work will be published as an e-book with open 
access. This will make a canonical text of Arab cultural heri-
tage accessible for the first time—and for free—to an English 
audience in classrooms and broader communities and publics. 
The e-project was made possible thanks to generous funding by 
Rice University’s Humanities Research Center (HRC), headed 
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by Farès el-Dahdah, and generous donations by Arwa and Aziz 
Shaibani, as well as Dania Dandashly. We greatly value their 
unwavering commitment to supporting Arab studies. We also 
appreciate the support of Ussama Makdisi, who, in his capacity 
as Arab-American Educational Foundation Professor in Arabic 
Studies at Rice University, endorsed our application for funding 
from HRC and agreed to write a foreword. Special thanks go to 
the staff at the University of California Press, particularly Rob-
ert Demke, Bradley Depew, Sabrina Robleh, and Emilia Thi-
uri, who have worked hard on editing our manuscript into shape 
and seeing it seamlessly through the production process. Our 
indexer, Linda Christian, has been a pleasure to work with, too.
Our translated text and the accompanying contextualiza-
tion offer one interpretation. We have tried to stay as loyal to 
the original meaning as possible. We take responsibility for any 
infelicities that the reader may detect and hope that our book 
encourages further critical debates on how best to represent the 
experience of past Arab intellectuals for future generations.
xiii
foreword
The Protestant educator journalist and encyclopedist Butrus 
al-Bustani was one of the great luminaries of the Arabic renais-
sance of the nineteenth century. His seminal pamphlets collec-
tively known as Nafir Suriyya were published in the immediate 
aftermath of the sectarian crisis of 1860 in Mount Lebanon and 
Damascus. They exhorted the inhabitants of Syria to unite, to 
eschew sectarian fanaticism, and to think critically about self 
and other. Jens Hanssen and Hicham Safieddine’s translation of 
Nafir Suriyya is excellent. It provides English-language readers a 
long overdue window into the very beginnings of what we might 
call an unrecognized antisectarian tradition in the Arab world. 
To talk about antisectarianism is, of course, to suggest a new 
way of thinking about an often Orientalized region. Rather than 
seeing it as a place of eternal sectarian conflict, it seems so much 
more interesting to see the Arab world as a place, beginning in 
1860, of constant willed work on the part of men and women 
who have grappled with the problem of politicized religious or 
ethnic difference.
xiv / Foreword
For well over a century, Arabs (and their non-Arab counter-
parts across the region) have fought against the scourge of sec-
tarianism in a manner analogous to how South Asians have fought 
against communalism, and how Americans have fought against 
racism. Both sectarianism and antisectarianism are habits of the 
mind as much as they are political, social, or economic practices.
The exhortations in Nafir Suriyya to national unity antici-
pate the great question of secular affiliation that every Arab 
subject of the modern era has had to face: how to reconcile the 
principle of secular equality with the historic reality of religious 
and ethnic diversity; how to do so at a time of constant Western 
imperialism and interventionism that relentlessly exploit this 
diversity; and how to do so in the face of the terrible expressions 
of sectarian fanaticism that constantly undermine the ability of 
Arabs to create a society greater than the sum of their commu-
nal parts. The ecumenical Bustani understood what many in the 
contemporary Arab world still understand: that each of us, as 
individuals, has a choice to make about how to affiliate with our 
diverse world. We can read the world in sectarian terms or in 
secular ones. We can choose to be part of an emancipatory proj-
ect or a repressive one. Both choices can be rationalized, but 





Jens hanssen and hicham safieddine
News of the spell of atrocities and abominations committed this 
summer by the troublemakers in our midst has reached the corners 
of the Earth. All over the civilized world, it has drawn pity and 
gloom on one hand, and anger and wrath on the other.
With these opening lines, Nafir Suriyya—The Clarion of Syria—
launched its urgent appeal to overcome the civil war in Mount 
Lebanon and Damascus in the summer of 1860, and to rebuild 
Syrian society in the war’s aftermath. This key text of the 
Nahda—the nineteenth-century Arabic reform and revival 
movement—has recently received renewed popular and schol-
arly attention.1 At the time of its publication, Nafir Suriyya ran 
as a series of eleven pamphlets by an anonymous author from 
September 1860 to April 1861.2 The pamphlets did not present a 
detailed litany of atrocities, which other contemporary eyewit-
nesses provided.3 Rather, they addressed an array of universally 
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resonant and locally relevant themes that render the pamphlets 
pertinent beyond their immediate context. With a style oscillat-
ing between Paulinian sermon and Socratic dialogue, the author 
ponders the meaning of civil war in relation to religion, politics, 
morality, society, and civilization.
The author expresses gratitude for European intervention 
but warns in passing of its potential long-term harm. Key pas-
sages evince a subtle understanding of the rights of “man” on 
the one hand, and a bourgeois deference to the rule of law and 
political authority on the other. The pamphlets also advocate 
the twin prerogatives of opposing separation between people 
of the same homeland based on religion or kinship and pro-
posing the separation of religious and political authority; they 
espouse an Ottoman reformism that affirms loyalty to the impe-
rial center but calls for the rulers to attend to the welfare of their 
subjects. Other passages grapple with the task of refuting Orien-
talist stereotypes about Arabs while at the same time embracing 
some of its underlying assumptions. Still others extol the value 
of Western civilization and its racialized hierarchy of nations 
but warn against superficial emulation. Above all, Nafir Suriyya 
was an antisectarian clarion call to build a cohesive and “civi-
lized” Syrian society in place of what the author considered a 
community riven with the most pernicious of conflicts, violent 
fanaticism, and factionalism. As the author put it:
The worst thing under the firmament is war, and the most horren-
dous among them are civil wars, which break out between people 
of a single country and which are often triggered by trivial causes 
and for ignoble aims. (Nafir Suriyya 5, November 1, 1860)
Current impressions of Yemen, Libya, and Syria to the contrary, 
civil wars are not a particularly more common occurrence in 
Middle Eastern history compared to other regions.4 But as is the 
case in other parts of the world, past conflicts that would qualify 
as civil wars by today’s standards cast very long shadows into the 
present. One example is the Battle of the Camel, which broke 
out in 656 ad and marked one of the first wars between Muslim 
armies. Even though it was a war over worldly succession that 
took place over a millennium ago, it continues to be invoked 
to incite sectarian strife and explain contemporary Sunni-Shia 
rivalries.5 The memory of foreign invasions, too, continues to 
haunt the Arab world. The sackings of Jerusalem by Crusaders 
in 1099 and of Baghdad by Mongols in 1258 had their apoca-
lyptic chroniclers whose lamentations have resurfaced repeat-
edly since American-led armies started the current destruction 
of Iraq in 2003.6 In the modern period, revolutions were often 
derided as civil wars by conservatives or royalists.7 Some con-
flicts that came to be labeled “civil wars” were, in fact, state 
pogroms (like the Young Turk genocide of Anatolian Arme-
nians during World War I), settler-colonial conquests (like the 
Zionist ethnic cleansing of Palestine in 1948), or wars of inde-
pendence, most notably the Algerian liberation struggle against 
colonial France (1954–62).8
The French invasion of Egypt in 1798 gave modern Arab intel-
lectual history its colonial frame.9 At the time, however, Napo-
leon’s army elicited an entertaining mixture of opprobrium and 
ridicule. The chroniclers Aʿbd al-Rahman al-Jabarti and Hasan 
al-ʿ Attar believed Napoleon’s rhetoric of liberating Egyptians 
from Mamluk oppression no more than the Iraqis greeted US 
soldiers with flowers in 2003.10 By contrast, the Nakba of Pales-
tine in 1948 prompted Constantin Zurayk’s famous call in his The 
Meaning of Disaster for a fundamental social, political, and mil-
itary transformation of the Arab world in order to survive and 
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compete against the persistence of imperialism and the success of 
Zionism.11 The subsequent Arab military defeat in 1967 generated 
Sadik al-ʿ Azm’s Self-Criticism after the Defeat, in which he blamed 
the lack of a sustained intellectual response on, among other 
things, the Arabs’ purported “clever personality” syndrome, or al-
fahlawiyyah. Despite the ideological differences between Zurayq 
and al-ʿ Azm, as well as the latter’s orientalist psychologizing, 
both authors warned that Arab defeats were partly a symptom of 
deeper social ills. They implored their readers to take the catas-
trophes as wake-up calls to expose the bankruptcy of existing 
regimes and build progressive societies capable of autonomous 
and equitable national development.12
Its specific historical context notwithstanding, the eleven 
pamphlets that made up Nafir Suriyya anticipated the ambiva-
lence of introspection found in Zurayq’s and al-ʿ Azm’s texts. Its 
anonymous author had to deal with civil war—“the most dispar-
aged of all wars”13—and the specter of European encroachment. 
What elicited particular concern on the pages of Nafir Suriyya 
were the ominous signs that before “fellow countrymen” could 
become good neighbors again, the purportedly empathetic 
European eyewitness would turn into military saviors and 
suspend the process of social healing indefinitely. While Nafir 
Suriyya grappled with the civil war in Mount Lebanon and the 
ensuing Bab Tuma massacre in Damascus, the full diplomatic 
and journalistic force of Great Power rivalry on the Eastern 
Mediterranean shores unleashed the first international humani-
tarian intervention of its kind.14
The duplicity and opportunism of this intervention by 
European imperial powers during the “Syrian disturbances” 
are largely absent from al-Bustani’s account. But they were 
astutely dissected at the time by Karl Marx in one of his regular 
dispatches to the New York Daily Tribune.15 The author of Nafir 
Suriyya appreciated and generally ascribed noble motives to 
Ottoman, European, and American intervention. By contrast, 
Marx noted that the French press feigned outrage at the dis-
turbances and supported Napoleon III’s designs of pacification 
by annexation, and that the Russian government, too, favored 
military intervention to deflect from domestic troubles. Four 
years after the Crimean War, it was evident according to Marx 
“that the autocrat of France and the autocrat of Russia, laboring 
under the same urgent necessity of sounding the war-trumpet, 
act in common concert.” Meanwhile, the Prussian government 
was opposed to military action but, Marx opined, only because 
a Prussian adventure in Syria would put in jeopardy the proj-
ect of German unification.16 Despite his scathing critique of 
foreign power intervention and connivance, Marx shared the 
biases of the liberal press and the conservative politicians about 
the “barbarous clans of the Lebanon” as he ended his article 
with a damning judgment of international incitement and local 
political pathologies:
In respect to England I will only add, that, in 1841, Lord Palmerston 
furnished the Druses with the arms they kept ever since, and that, 
in 1846, by a convention with the Czar Nicholas, he abolished, in 
point of fact, the Turkish sway that curbed the wild tribes of the 
Lebanon, and stipulated for them a quasi-independence which, in 
the run of time, and under the proper management of foreign plot-
ters, could only beget a harvest of blood.17
In light of even the most astute European commentators’ reduc-
tionist assumptions about the local “wild tribes” of 1860s, the 
historical and literary significance of Nafir Suriyya cannot be 
overestimated. Nafir Suriyya’s author evokes the language of 
“tribalism,” but as part of a more elaborate critique of the local 
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dimensions of the civil war that befell his homeland. Civil wars 
rarely speak their names. Frequently, euphemisms like “distur-
bances,” “troubles,” or just “events” mask the atrocities commit-
ted and the modern forces that produced them. Lebanon and 
Syria are no exception. Nafir Suriyya used al-khirba (ruinous 
event) and the more conventional label al-fitna, which is invoked 
today to refer to the “discord” of 656–80 that supposedly begot 
perennial Sunnis-Shia rivalry.18 More significantly, Nafir Suriyya 
also introduced the term civil war (al-harb al-ahliyya).19 This neol-
ogism gestured toward two important aspects that set 1860 apart 
from previous conceptions of communal violence: it was “civil” 
in that the violence was carried out between fellow inhabit-
ants, by armed civilians on unarmed civilians; and it was a 
“war” because of its scale and international dimension. For Nafir 
Suriyya’s author, this was a social conflict carried out by military 
means at a time when communal feuds and factionalism were 
supposed to have been superseded by the march of history and 
by people’s recognition of the human interdependence in mod-
ern society. The civil war has led—he laments—to human suf-
fering and material loss, to mass dispersion of people, forced and 
voluntary exile, and widespread “homesickness” among fugitive 
victims and perpetrators alike. Even as the immediacy of the 
civil war and its author’s evolving subjectivity make The Clarion 
of Syria a visceral, contradictory, at times repetitive, and always 
challenging text to read, it evinces a profound and painful her-
meneutic process on the part of its author that was unprece-
dented in Arabic literature and remarkable by any standard for 
its time.
It is unclear when exactly the identity of the pamphlets’ 
author—a “patriot”—was revealed. Contemporary obituaries 
of one of the leading intellectuals and scholars in Beirut, Butrus 
al-Bustani, indicate he was known to be behind these pamphlets 
during his lifetime. He himself claimed authorship of Nafir Suriyya 
in the entry for nafara in Muhit al-Muhit (1867). Born into a socially 
reputable Maronite family in 1819, al-Bustani came into contact 
with American missionaries around 1840, which shaped his think-
ing throughout his life. In the 1850s, he worked as a dragoman for 
the American consul. It is no surprise then that al-Bustani’s Nafir 
Suriyya shared a civilizational discourse with foundational Euro-
American texts that cut across geography, culture, genre, and 
style. Its ardent patriotic tone, if not content, resonates in part 
with “The Address to the German Nation,” which Johann Got-
tlieb Fichte penned in Berlin during the French occupation in 
1807, and in some respects with Simón Bolívar’s “Jamaican Let-
ter” of 1815, which later became a South American independence 
manifesto. Perhaps a more accurate analogy with Romantic ide-
alism is Heinrich Heine whose love-hate relationship with fellow 
Germans and Jews resonates with Nafir Suriyya’s concern for—
and scathing critique of—Syrians’ purported lack of self-respect, 
misplaced sense of honor, and violent intolerance. Nafir Suriyya’s 
invocation of the promise of civilization and the threat of bar-
barism also conjures up the conservative elitism of Matthew 
Arnold’s Culture and Anarchy (1867) and of Domingo Sarmien-
to’s liberal autobiographical novel and political manifesto for a 
strong Argentinian state, Facundo (1845).20
After the civil war in 1860, al-Bustani dedicated his life to 
Arab history, literature, and language. He founded schools, news-
papers, encyclopaedias, and dictionaries. When he died in May 
1883, his obituaries listed Nafir Suriyya among his major literary 
achievements.21 One year later, his son Salim also passed away. 
The death of the Bustanis marked a downturn in Beirut’s Nahda. 
Starting in the late 1870s, the Ottoman sultan Abdülhamid II’s 
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regime clamped down on political activism in Beirut. The press 
came to be censored, and many journalists left for British-occu-
pied Egypt, where they embraced the new scientific outlooks: 
Darwinism, materialism, and socialism.22 Finally in 1886, the 
Ottoman authorities closed the flagship of the al-Bustani fam-
ily’s intellectual enterprise, al-Jinan, apparently because of a 
glowing editorial by al-Bustani’s son, Najib, in praise of the sul-
tan’s erstwhile nemesis Midhat Pasha, who had been the archi-
tect of the Ottoman constitution and governor general of Syria 
in the late 1870s.23 American missionaries at the Syrian Protes-
tant College, too, had clamped down on the liberal aspirations 
of students and some faculty. English became the language of 
instruction. This was anathema to al-Bustani, who had insisted 
in Nafir Suriyya on Arabic as the unifying language of educa-
tion. Moreover, the college administration sacked a recently 
hired chemistry professor for challenging Christian creation-
ism and endorsing Charles Darwin’s and Charles Leil’s ideas on 
evolutionary biology.24
These new political, economic, and cultural developments 
from the early 1880s onward challenged the way the Bustanis’ 
and their contemporaries viewed their role as public intellec-
tuals. New Imperialism and the attendant discourses of race 
threatened but did not eliminate the Bustanis’ “ecumenical 
humanism”—to use Ussama Makdisi’s evocative phrase.25 These 
sociopolitical transformations had a profound effect on the Ara-
bic language, not least because some experimental vocabulary 
disappeared while many terms changed their meaning. The role 
of al-Bustani in reviving and revising modern Arabic, partly 
through translation, is undeniable.26 Translation was the activ-
ity that characterized all phases of his life. As a boy, he stud-
ied classical and modern languages extensively; later in life, he 
helped translate the Bible into Arabic before serving as a drago-
man for the US consulate; he edited al-Mutanabbi’s Diwan and 
translated Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe. As the host of many literary 
societies and founding editor of al-Jinan he dedicated himself to 
the dissemination of historical knowledge and foreign ideas. As 
a lexicographer, he defined the meanings of terms and pinned 
down the semantic structure of Arabic; and as a cultural entre-
preneur he made available a concise history of the world in the 
homes of educated Arabs.
His mastery of Arabic notwithstanding, al-Bustani struggled 
to find the right language to translate the horrors of the civil 
war into lessons learned. For us, the task of rendering his inter-
pretation legible in English more than a century and a half later 
was a double struggle of translating text and context. To address 
this twin challenge, the book is divided into two parts. Part 1 
provides context—historical, conceptual, and biographical—to 
the war, the work at hand, and its author. Part 2, beginning with 
chapter 6, offers the first full translation of all eleven pamphlets. 
In part 1, the first chapter outlines the socioeconomic and politi-
cal conditions that underlie the civil strife of 1860. Contrary to 
what al-Bustani suggested in Nafir Suriyya, the war was much 
more than a product of communal hatred and sectarian preju-
dice triggered by “trivial causes.” Elite rivalries, class conflict, 
imperial reform, and foreign intervention planted the seeds for 
an all-out violent conflagration and stoked its fire afterward. 
These complex social transformations left their deep mark on 
al-Bustani’s own life trajectory, which we chart in chapter 3. We 
highlight al-Bustani’s religious conversion, literary innovation, 
and cultural contribution through his writings and educational 
activity, all of which turned him into a key figure of the nine-
teenth-century Nahda. Chapter 4 discusses the historiography 
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that produced different scholarly articulations of the Nahda 
through diverse interpretations of Nafir Suriyya and its mean-
ing. We close our contextual section with a conceptual study 
of the etymological origins and sociopolitical significance of al-
Bustani’s innovative terminology, such as nafir, gharadh, al-harb 
al-ahliyya, and most prominently, al-watan. This last term lay at 
the heart of a new lexicon of communal belonging and patrio-
tism that al-Bustani and other Arab reformers of his time sought 
to instill in their interlocutors. Far from the chauvinistic nation-
alism that might be conjured up today, al-Bustani invoked love 
of the homeland—as we elaborate in chapter 5—as an antisec-
tarian panacea, a necessary individual and collective disposition 
to build an inclusive postwar society, with all its utopian prom-
ises and concrete contradictions.
Pa rt I




ch a p t e r 1
The War of 1860
Roots and Ramifications
Jens hanssen and hicham safieddine
The idea of an independent Lebanon stretching back to early 
Ottoman times has more to do with the work of historians than 
with geographical or social givens of history. From the Maronite 
patriarch Istifan al-Duwayhi (1629–1704) to prominent scholar 
Kamal Salibi (1929–2011), historians of Lebanon have focused 
on the Druze-Maronite rivalry as one of the primordial driv-
ing forces behind the crystallization of modern  Lebanon. 
Two formative periods according to this narrative were the reign 
of Fakhr al-Din II al-Maʿ ani (1572–1635) and the later  Shihabi 
emirate (1789–1840). This approach wrote out of  Lebanon’s his-
tory ruling families of other denominations and the populations 
of the areas surrounding what became Mt.  Lebanon in the late 
eighteenth century.1 Only recently has the rule of Shiʿa vas-
sals such as the Hamadas in the northern districts of Mt. Leb-
anon been studied critically.2 It lasted, unevenly, for much of 
the seventeenth century and finally ended when the Ottoman 
army marched against the Hamadas in 1693–94 and forced them 
to retreat to the Bekaʿ  Valley in the east and Bilad Bishara in 
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the south. The Shihabi emirs stepped into this political void, 
encouraged Maronite settlement in Kisrawan, and built an effec-
tive tax-collecting statelet for the Druze and Maronite notabil-
ity. Privileging the Druze-Maronite rivalry has also obscured 
the socioeconomic integration and political overlap between the 
coastal and mountainous regions and the rest of Syria, or Bilad 
al-Sham. The relative autonomy of Shihabi-ruled Mt. Lebanon 
was no exception in what Albert Hourani memorably labeled 
the golden age of the Ottoman politics of notables in the eigh-
teenth century. The emirate coexisted alongside al-ʿ Azm fam-
ily-rule in Damascus and Zahir al-ʿ Umar’s and Ahmad Pasha 
al-Jazzar’s reign in Acre.3
Nahda-era historians consecrated the Sonderweg narra-
tive of an independent Shihabi emirate. For example, Nasif 
 al-Yaziji’s historical treatise on the feudal conditions of Mt. 
Lebanon completed in 1833, elided the wider Ottoman context 
of Bilad al-Sham, and equally ignored Mt. Lebanon’s past as 
home to other confessional denominations and those ruling 
elites that were neither Druze nor Maronite.4 In turn, the nar-
rative of al-Yaziji (1801–71) influenced Tannus Shidyaq’s monu-
mental dynastic history of notable families, Akhbar al-aʿ yan fi 
Jabal Lubnan, which Butrus al-Bustani edited and published 
in 1859.5 There was nothing particularly nationalist or sectar-
ian about the “feudal conditions” that either al-Yaziji or Tan-
nus Shidyaq sketched for Mt. Lebanon. But their narrative 
enshrined the idea of Mt. Lebanon as an organic, if contested, 
territorial unit and “imagined principality” of Shihabi rule. 
What is less emphasized in this literature is that the struc-
tural and class-based seeds of the civil war of 1860 were sown 
during Shihabi rule.6
The War of 1860 / 15
mountain emirs and mounting conflicts
When the Ottomans defeated the Mamluk army at Marj Dabiq, 
north of Aleppo, in 1516, they established their civil and military 
administration of Bilad al-Sham around three, later four, provin-
cial capitals: Aleppo, Damascus, Tripoli, and Saida. Over time, 
the provinces were parceled out into emirates and granted to 
military clients in charge of tax collection. The early seven-
teenth century witnessed shifting alliances and rivalries over 
Ottoman tax concessions and in pursuit of territorial expansion. 
Eventually, the conniving Druze emir of the Shuf mountains, 
Fakhr al-Din II Maʿ ani, sought military and  financial assistance 
from Italian city-states and the Vatican to self-enrich and secede 
from Ottoman rule. Originally granted tax-farming rights by the 
Ottomans, Fakhr al-Din II developed his own tax base through 
recruiting hitherto reclusive Maronites as tax collectors—some 
of them recent converts from Shi’ism. He also wove out trade 
ties with Italian merchants and opened his realm to Jesuit and 
other Catholic missionaries. When his power grew to include 
the mountain and coastal areas, thereby threatening Ottoman 
authority, the imperial government treated him as a rebel. Fol-
lowing his capture and later execution in 1633, his tax concessions 
either reverted to old rivals, like the Harfushs of the Kisrawan 
district, or to smaller upstart families like the Shihabis of Wadi 
al-Taym. The latter would replace the Maʿ anis as the major rul-
ing house of Mt. Lebanon in the late eighteenth century.7 Emir 
Bashir II al-Shihabi (1767–1850) ruled over the intricate web of 
kinship loyalties extending across Mt. Lebanon for over fifty 
years. Nominally under the authority of the Ottoman governor 
in Acre and later under Egypt’s General Ibrahim Pasha, Bashir 
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II managed to shift the balance of power away from Istanbul. His 
rule was sustained by the wealth and power of landed families, 
but the financial pressures on this system grew exponentially 
as the Ottoman governors in Acre demanded ever-higher taxes 
from him only to be passed on to the peasants.
European and Ottoman rivalry deeply affected the social, 
political, and economic order of Mt. Lebanon before and dur-
ing Bashir II’s reign. The Ottoman empire was forced to 
make unprecedented concessions to the other European pow-
ers in the peace treaty with Russia at Küçük Kaynarca in 1774. 
 Subsequent military incursions from Egypt strengthened the 
Ottoman government’s commitment to local power dynasties 
in Acre and Damascus. Short military campaigns by Russia in 
Beirut (1772 and 1774) and France in Egypt (1798) and Palestine 
(1800–01) brought European interests in the region menacingly 
close. But the greatest challenge to the Shihabi regime came 
from peasant uprisings.8 In 1821, thousands of predominantly 
Christian but also Druze commoners from the Kisrawan and 
Matn regions gathered north of Beirut to refuse the emir’s tax 
demands. Squeezed between popular resistance and a hostile 
Ottoman governor in Saida, Emir Bashir II fled to the Hawran 
region. However, his rivals were unable to capitalize on Bashir’s 
exile. Instead, the allied Jumblat forces crushed the uprising 
and confiscated its leaders’ belongings. Bashir II was pardoned 
and returned to his palace in Bait al-Din.9 Four years later, the 
emir had the Druze leader and erstwhile ally Bashir Jumblat 
killed and distributed the latter faction’s lands to the Maronite 
church and notables, and “for the first time in the history of 
the Emirate, Christian officials nearly monopolized the highest 
political positions.”10
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During this period, the thriving silk trade in the largely Druze-
populated Shuf Mountains had brought about a large-scale, 
southbound Maronite labor migration. Druze notables began to 
seek the council and scribal services of Christians. Some Druze 
and Muslims converted to Christianity, including  members of 
the ruling Shihabi dynasty. In fact, until the  Egyptian invasion 
in 1831, there was a widely tolerated and officially sanctioned con-
fessional ambivalence.11 Emir Bashir II’s own religious affiliation 
depended on the context in which he found himself. European 
travelers to Mt. Lebanon expressed exasperation at the inde-
terminacy of the emir’s “true belief.” One British traveler com-
plained that Bashir II had “a religion to suit the place he may 
be in; when he comes down to Beirut, he goes to the mosque; 
but in the mountain he is always a  Christian.”12 The increased 
sectarian incitement of foreign powers coupled with the intro-
duction of principles of equality among Ottoman subjects made 
such ambivalence untenable and exacerbated class and religious 
 divisions leading up to civil strife and outright rebellion.
reform and rebellion
From 1831 to 1840, Egypt occupied Bilad al-Sham and  subjected the 
population to a series of centralizing reforms. General  Ibrahim 
Pasha established greater public security and opened up society 
and the economy to European merchant capital.13 He also took 
the fateful measure of drafting Christians to suppress Druze 
revolts, thereby effectively turning shifting factional tensions 
into increasingly fixed religious enmity. While Bashir II “was 
a contented master in a gilded cage,” the commoners felt the 
crunch of “taxation, conscription, disarmament, deforestation, 
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and corvée labour.”14 On June 8, 1840, commoners from all 
denominations gathered to declare open revolt against Egyptian 
rule. The meeting in Antilyas, as Nafir Suriyya reminded its read-
ers, was noticeable not only for its cross-communal alliance but 
also because the rebels got their leaders to speak in the name of 
the people, liberty, and Ottoman legitimacy.15
The days of Shihabi rule were numbered when a British-
Austrian naval attack a little later in 1840 ousted the Egyptian 
army and exiled the aging emir to Malta. The periodic out-
breaks of communal violence in 1841, 1844, and 1860 as well as 
the Maronite peasant uprising against their Maronite landlords 
of 1858–59 drew European powers into two decades of conflict 
over the geographical, demographic, and administrative con-
tours of Mt. Lebanon. The Maronite patriarch, his bishops, 
and French Catholic circles in particular echoed one another’s 
myths about the inviolable “privileges and traditions” of the 
Maronite community and the historical connections—if not 
“blood ties”—between the latter and the French. Many Leb-
anese nationalists were later to accept as a given the chimera 
of Christian entitlement to Mt. Lebanon that emerged only 
during this mutual mirroring between French and Maronite 
Church claims.16 At the time, the French-Maronite project faced 
a number of obstacles, however. Not only did the French gov-
ernment subordinate it to the larger concerns of the Eastern 
Question but the Maronite community itself was deeply split 
over the future of Mt. Lebanon. Moreover, the Ottoman gov-
ernment, backed by the British, sought to integrate Mt. Lebanon 
into a reorganized Bilad al-Sham and to balance the Maronites’ 
political ambition with support for the Druze notables, espe-
cially the returning landlords whose authority Emir Bashir II 
had usurped. A battle of petitions ensued in which Ottomans 
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and local leaders tried to buttress their visions with representa-
tions of “popular sentiments.”17
Conflicting claims were compounded by different interpre-
tations of the Ottoman reform discourse that had been inaugu-
rated by the Gülhane Decree of 1839. Partially because of the 
Ottoman decree’s invocation of equality, Maronite commoners 
felt entitled to challenge the traditional authority of the Druze 
landlords, who in turn rejected the notion of equality and 
insisted on their obedience. In 1841, a seemingly innocuous dis-
pute over hunting rights in a village near the prosperous mixed 
town of Dayr al-Qamar led to an attack by armed Druze men. 
The incident eviscerated Maʿ ani and Shihabi practices of coop-
eration between Druze landed elites and the Maronite Church. 
Ottoman and European schemes to resolve this new crisis were 
based on the assumption that it was an outburst of primordial 
enmity and designed to suit the interests of these powers. The 
compromise outcome was the administrative reorganization 
of Mt. Lebanon along communal lines in 1842 and 1845, which 
some historians have identified as the first institutionalization of 
the modern phenomenon of sectarianism.18
The international compromise that prevailed from 1845 to 
1858—the dual qaimaqamate—saw the northern mountain range 
administered by a Maronite notable, the southern mountains by 
a Druze notable, and the mixed districts by a representative of 
minority populations, under the general authority of the Otto-
man governor in Saida. This complicated arrangement satisfied 
neither those who felt their social power eroding nor the peas-
ants who felt emboldened by the reformist discourse of repre-
sentation and started challenging the authority of their masters.
The popular uprising in the Kisrawan district of 1858–59 
was the peasants’ response to the dual qaimaqamate. Under the 
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leadership of Tanyus Shahin, a muleteer from the village of 
Rayfun, hundreds of armed Maronite commoners drove the 
coconfessional Khazin muqataʿ jis out of their districts and looted 
their residences. What distinguished this uprising from previ-
ous ones was that the rebels appropriated the Ottoman reform 
discourse to challenge the social hierarchy by mobilizing their 
faith for political purposes and against a notable family of the 
same faith-based community.19 Between 1841 and 1858, then, 
the burgeoning idea of an autonomous Mt. Lebanon replaced 
the “feudal order”—still upheld by al-Yaziji and Tannus al-
Shidyaq—with a new conception of social equality and political 
representation.
In May 1860, a few hundred rebels crossed the al-Kalb River 
heading south, where, they conjectured, their fellow Maronite 
peasants needed protection from Druze overlords. The appear-
ance of bands of well-armed men in the mixed district of Matn 
inflamed an already tense situation.20 Most scholars today agree 
that the skirmishes of the last week in May started the all-out 
civil war in Mt. Lebanon and were caused by Christian attacks 
on Druze villages. Within days the fighting spread to Wadi 
al-Taym, where seventeen Shihabi family members were hunted 
down and murdered, and to the Jezzin district, where fifteen 
hundred Christian residents were killed. Many more fled to the 
coastal city of Saida and to the town of Hasbaya at the foot of 
Mt. Hermon, where a further massacre of unarmed Christians 
occurred in early June. In mid-June, the city of Zahleh, in the 
northern Bekaʿ  Valley, fell to Druze forces.21 On June 21, Dayr 
al-Qamar was sacked long after its inhabitants had surrendered 
and an estimated two thousand Christians were massacred.22
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sectarian orders, imperial pacifications, and 
patriotic visions
News of the civil war in Mt. Lebanon and Damascus traveled 
fast to Europe and beyond. France was quickest to respond. 
Paris dispatched an army of six thousand soldiers under Gen-
eral de Beaufort d’Hautpoul, whose mission was to punish the 
Druze victors and revive what Carol Hakim described as the 
“Franco-Lebanese dream” of Christian sovereignty. General 
de Beaufort adopted the Maronite clergy’s position, expressed 
forcefully by the Bishop of Saida and Butrus al-Bustani’s avun-
cular nemesis Aʿbdallah al-Bustani (1780–1866). The latter 
informed Napoleon III that “the French expedition has come to 
Syria to protect the Christians and deliver them from oppres-
sion and tyranny.”23
But de Beaufort had to contend with his own government, 
which had a more comprehensive view of the problem, as well 
as with the skillful Ottoman special envoy, Fu aʾd Pasha, who 
was determined to nip European military intervention in the 
bud. Fu aʾd Pasha’s pacification policy, too, singled out the 
Druze leadership, including Bashir Jumblat’s son, Saʿ id Bey, 
as the main culprit, and had them hanged or exiled. Com-
pared to Ottoman interventions of the earlier times, which 
the old mantra “let bygones be bygones” best exemplified, 
Fu aʾd Pasha sought to mark a clean break with the past.24 
Significantly, he had a postwar vision for Bilad al-Sham as a 
whole, a vision that the young British representative on the 
International Commission of Inquiry, Lord Dufferin, shared 
when he declared that
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As a general rule when you have to deal with a large population 
differing in their religious opinions, but perfectly assimilated in 
language and manners and habits of thought, the principle of fusion 
rather than that of separation is the one to be adopted. Religious 
beliefs ought not be converted into a geographical expression, and 
a wise government would insist upon the various subject sects sub-
ordinating their polemical to their civil relations with one another.25
In this immediate and urgent context, Nafir Suriyya’s narra-
tive sided with Fu aʾd Pasha and Lord Dufferin against the 
 Franco-Lebanese vision in general and against Bishop Aʿbdallah 
al-Bustani in particular. Effectively, Butrus al-Bustani called 
out the bishop’s Maronite victimology.26 As our translation in 
part 2 shows, Nafir Suriyya also partially adopted al-Yaziji’s and 
 Tannus Shidyaq’s version of history, according to which the 
 Druze-Maronite consensus held together the particular com-
munal and feudal mixture of the region’s time-honored sys-
tem of rule. The underlying engine of this history was family 
factionalism, which, as al-Bustani reiterated, went back to the 
rivalry between northern Arabian (Qaysi) and southern Arabian 
(Yamani) settlement in Bilad al-Sham during the Arab conquest. 
al-Bustani, however, recast this condition as a liability where 
his predecessors saw in it an asset. He acknowledged in Nafir 
Suriyya that the civil war in 1860 was not an isolated mountain 
affair but affected Bilad al-Sham as a whole. As we will argue 
in the last chapter of part 1, the title Nafir Suriyya gestured 
toward this wider geographical context and raised the idea that 
it was the shared experience of civil war that bound all people 
in Bilad  al-Sham together as “Syrians” in an affective commu-
nity of “compatriots” under the sign of Ottoman sovereignty. al-
Bustani’s own life trajectory, to which the next chapter turns, 
embodied this vision with all its promises and pitfalls.
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Butrus al-Bustani
From Protestant Convert to Ottoman Patriot 
and Arab Reformer
Jens hanssen and hicham safieddine
Butrus al-Bustani is a key figure of nineteenth-century Nahda.1 
Historians relied mainly on obituaries and funeral speeches to 
piece together what amounted to the biography of a remark-
ably complex and evolving thinker. The family of Butrus, son of 
Bulus, son of Aʿbdallah al-Bustani, hailed from the northern vil-
lage of Baqr Qasha in Mt. Lebanon, situated between the coastal 
city of Tripoli and the highland town of Bsharré.2 In the late 
eighteenth century, Butrus’s grandfather moved to the confes-
sionally mixed and economically prospering town of Dayr al-
Qamar in Mt. Lebanon’s Shuf Mountains. The latter sloped up 
from the coastal strip stretching between the Ottoman admin-
istrative center of Saida in the south and the emerging port and 
economic powerhouse of Beirut in the north. The grandfather 
then settled in nearby Dibbieh, where Butrus was later born in 
November 1819.3 Around this time, Maronite peasants began to 
migrate south into the Shuf—which was dominated by Druze 
emirs and sheikhs—to look for work in the silk industry. Mean-
while, Greek Orthodox and Catholic families established minor 
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intellectual centers in nearby Shwayfat, Kafr Shima, Shemlan, 
and coastal Damour.4
Young Butrus attended the prestigious Maronite boarding 
school at Aʿyn Warqa, where he studied and later taught theol-
ogy, logic, and philosophy and acquired a number of classical 
and contemporary languages. According to George Antonius, 
he “stood out among his contemporaries, both for his character 
and for the brilliance of his attainments; and the monks selected 
him for a scholarship at the Maronite College in Rome. He 
was willing to go but his recently widowed mother wept at the 
thought of her son being sent so far and entreated him to stay.”5 
al-Bustani left Aʿyn Warqa after the Egyptian occupation and 
the reign of Bashir II ended in 1840 but remained in the Saida-
Dayr al-Qamar-Beirut triangle all his life.
Many of al-Bustani’s future associates would leave Mt. Leba-
non for the same Beirut neighborhood, the extramural Zokak 
al-Blat, where Protestant missionaries had set up shop. Nasif al-
Yaziji left the court of the Arslan emirs at Kafr Shima in 1840. 
Other Nahdawis arrived in Zokak al-Blat at around the same 
time. Khalil al-Khuri (1836–1907), Beirut’s first private newspa-
per owner, was the first to popularize a sense of Syrian identity.6 
Khalil Sarkis (1842–1915), an orphaned convert to Protestantism 
who was to apprentice at Khuri’s Hadiqat al-Akhbar, arrived in 
the neighborhood as a young boy. Sarkis became al-Bustani’s in-
law and founded the newspaper Lisan al-Hal. After 1860, schol-
ars like Husayn Bayhum (1833–81) and Aʿbd al-Qadir al-Qabbani 
(1847–1935) also moved to Zokak al-Blat from intramural Beirut 
to form scientific, literary, and educational partnerships with 
these Mt. Lebanon emigres.7
al-Bustani’s descent from the Shuf Mountains to the coast 
was a move into exile in two senses: he left behind his home, 
job, and family, and he also left behind his Maronite faith. 
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There are conflicting stories about al-Bustani’s conversion 
to Protestantism but the following reconstruction appears 
the most plausible: al-Bustani had a faith-related fallout in 
Aʿyn Warqa—probably with the Maronite patriarch himself. 
Such disagreement may, in the worst case, have resulted in 
excommunication and banishment, even death. To escape such 
a fate, he quit his job and relocated to Beirut, where Protes-
tant missionaries had opened a chapel for preaching in Arabic 
the previous year.8 al-Bustani’s reputation as a “famous student 
from a famous school, proficient in Arabic, Syriac, knowing 
Latin and speaking Italian” preceded him. He was welcomed in 
the American mission, where, in the recollections of his friend 
Cornelius Van Dyck, “it was not long before he acquired the 
English language.”9
The less friendly Protestant missionary Henri Jessup 
recalled that “about the year 1840 [al-Bustani] found, in reading 
the  Syriac Testament, the doctrine of justification by faith, and 
leaving the monastic retreat, fled to Beirut, where he entered 
the house of Dr. Eli Smith [in Zokak al-Blat] for protection.”10 
Sometime before June 1842, al-Bustani “[had] become gradually, 
and from his own reflections, a firm Protestant, and manifest[ed] 
tender conscience.”11 al-Bustani and Smith became close friends 
and intellectual soul mates between 1841 and Smith’s death in 
1857. During this period, al-Bustani learned typesetting, book 
printing, and oratory skills. His first major Arabic translation, 
al-Bab al-maftuh fi ʿamal al-ruh in 1843, was Eli Smith’s doctrinal 
text of the Protestant faith. At the height of his missionary zeal, 
al-Bustani briefly considered the civil strife unfolding in the 
mid-1840s as an opportunity to proselytize, or—in his words—
“an opening for the propagation of the gospel and a hastening of 
the approach of the day of the discomfiture of false worships.” 
Yet, when he lost family members in a Druze raid on his village 
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Dibbieh in 1845, al-Bustani reportedly blamed its occurrence on 
irresponsible Christians who had provoked the conflict.12
al-Bustani’s marriage to Rahil Aʿta (1826–94) was a watershed 
in his life. While unacknowledged in the historiography until 
recently, their relationship came to influence the Nahda’s ideals 
of domestic love and equality.13 Rahil ʿAta was born to a Greek 
Orthodox family in Beirut. She was educated in the household 
of Eli and Sarah Smith (d. 1836), where she functioned as a kind 
of translator-companion in residence and “took a rank some-
where between a daughter and a servant.”14 She became one of 
the first girls at their American Mission School for Girls to learn 
English, and soon she began teaching there. She made a name 
for herself as a translator of children’s books into Arabic, and 
by the time Rahil and Butrus met at Eli Smith’s office, she was 
a leader in the growing community of Beirutis associated with 
the Protestant missionaries. Rahil hesitated to accept Butrus’s 
marriage proposal. When she finally did in 1843, it forced her to 
elope because her widowed mother disapproved of the groom 
on account of his conversion. Although historical sources on her 
are silent, Rahil appears to have been an active partner in al-
Bustani’s translation work for the missionaries, the evangelical 
work for the Native Church, and his social, educational, and lit-
erary activism. She also helped set up the first of Beirut’s many 
literary societies in late 1847.15
In the late 1840s, the American missionaries attempted to 
recruit al-Bustani to become an ordained minister.16 As with the 
Maronites’ attempt to send him to Rome, he was reluctant. Per-
haps his zeal had worn off, or his family duties took precedence. 
In a letter dated January 6, 1852, al-Bustani wrote to Smith: “my 
present resolution is to accept no office either religious or sec-
ular that is public, for many reasons which I wish to keep to 
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myself not wishing to be called upon to give them out.”17 Instead, 
he had organized the local Protestant community to petition 
for an Arabic-speaking Protestant church.18 After months of 
resistance from missionaries, the Native Church of Beirut was 
founded in 1848, the year al-Bustani was recalled to Beirut to 
work with Eli Smith on the massive project of translating the 
Bible into Arabic.19
Two years earlier, al-Bustani had joined the most 
 liberal-minded American missionary Cornelius van Dyck to 
teach at the new Protestant seminary of Aʿbayh. From there 
he commuted frequently back to Beirut to maintain his recent 
 marriage and growing family.20 Through Cornelius van Dyck’s 
intervention, al-Bustani finally obtained financial security when 
he became first dragoman at the American consulate in Beirut 
in 1851. The position, which he held until 1862, allowed him to 
gain financial self-subsistence to devote his career to education, 
publishing, and cultural life. He cofounded multiple salons that 
attracted a wide multiconfessional membership.21 al-Bustani lec-
tured on slavery, Beirut’s history, and classical Arabic poetry—
topics that suggest the growing intellectual curiosity he would 
pursue more systematically in the 1860s and 1870s. His first pub-
lications appeared in the 1840s: he translated The Pilgrim’s Progress 
in 1844; a textbook on arithmetic came out in 1848; and another 
on accounting three years later.22 His famous lecture “The Edu-
cation of Women,” published in 1849, “intended to bring about an 
awakening [nahda] of women’s determination to acquire knowl-
edge so that they are treated with dignity, and also to rally men to 
support the reform of the women’s dire situation and activities.”23
al-Bustani’s conversion to Protestantism was in part an 
escape from a Maronite clergy that had just abducted and 
killed’ Asʿ ad Shidyaq, one of the first Maronite converts.24 
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Asʿ ad Shidyaq died enchained in solitary confinement in 1830, 
disowned by his  family and abandoned by the American mis-
sionaries, who refused to come to his defence.25 Much later, al-
Bustani “broke the  Ottoman-Arab silence that had covered up 
the tragedy” in his manuscript Qissat Asʿ ad Shidyaq. Written in 
early 1860, it accused the Maronite patriarch in no uncertain 
terms of  culpability while at the same time eschewing the mis-
sionaries’ sectarian narrative of the events. As Makdisi cogently 
argues, al-Bustani did not present a holier-than-thou version 
but, rather, offered “an unprecedented ecumenism, and later [in 
Nafir Suriyya] a new liberal pluralism as intolerable to American 
missionaries as it was to the Maronite Church.”26
The promulgation of the Ottoman imperial reform decree—
the Hatt-ı Hümayun of 1856—had an immediate and profound 
impact on al-Bustani.27 What the Ottoman state offered was the 
opposite of what most foreign missionaries stood for. He became 
convinced that the Ottoman state’s commitment to protect-
ing the rights of all subjects would overcome the kind of vio-
lence and reentrenched feudal privilege that haunted Mt. Leba-
non since the withdrawal of Egyptian troops. Equality between 
Ottoman Muslims and Christians was a noble principle that al-
Bustani was willing to endorse in word and deed.28
The death of his friend and mentor Eli Smith, a year after 
al-Bustani’s Ottoman turn, led him to reconsider further his 
relationship with the Protestant mission in Beirut. Coopera-
tion on the Bible translation ceased. His break with the Ameri-
can missionaries was complete when, just before the civil war, 
he published his account of Asʿ ad al-Shidyaq’s conversion. Pre-
occupation with Arabic literature supplanted his evangelical-
ism. In 1859, al-Bustani delivered a long and much-referenced 
speech on Arab culture, its past glories, its independent forma-
tion from the rise of Islam, and its challenges in the present and 
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future. He identified the Arabic language as the cultural unifier 
of diverse religious groups and “races” in Bilad al-Sham. Revival 
and innovation were indispensable for survival vis à vis the West 
and essential to live up to the expectations of Ottoman reform.29
If the Hatt-ı Hümayun of 1856 had raised al-Bustani’s hopes for 
the possibility of creating modern foundations of society, the civil 
war in the summer of 1860 shook his optimism profoundly. The 
reckless behavior of “fanatical” Christian and Druze mountain 
communities not only “cost twenty thousand people their lives 
[and] burnt down approximately thirty thousand houses.” It also 
jeopardized the golden opportunity that the Ottoman reform 
decree provided for the development of their country.30 al-Bustani’s 
initial reaction to the fratricidal catastrophe was to immerse him-
self in the urgent task of organizing the international relief effort 
for the thousands of refugees who had arrived in Beirut from all 
over Mt. Lebanon and from Damascus in the summer of 1860. But 
his participation in the world’s first humanitarian aid operation 
could barely cover up the inner turmoil the civil war caused him. 
As he watched the mountain go up in “flames,” the suffering of his 
former Maronite community must have affected him regardless of 
his conversion or the question of who cast the first stone. It was as 
if his compatriots were unable to handle the responsibilities that 
came with the rights granted by the Ottoman sultan.
al-bustani after nafir suriyya
It is not entirely clear why al-Bustani stopped writing the 
 pamphlets of Nafir Suriyya in April 1861. Given that the eleventh 
issue reads in large part like a summary of points made previ-
ously, he appears to have planned to make this his last interven-
tion. His intention to stop writing may well have had to do with 
trying to reach a larger audience and having a more profound 
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effect on society through engaging with more long-term cultural 
projects. Bustani articulated his first ideas for the three proj-
ects his name became most associated with in Nafir  Suriyya: the 
foundation of al-Madrasa al-Wataniyya (the National School) in 
1863; the publication of a series of journals in 1870, the most long-
lived, innovative, and influential of which was al-Jinan; and his 
lexicographical work which started in 1867.31
al-Bustani declared education as the prime means to raise 
politically and socially responsible subjects in the ninth  pamphlet 
of Nafir Suriyya. After he passed on his job as a  dragoman at the 
American consulate general to his eldest son, Salim, he began 
lobbying for Ottoman permissions and local funding for the 
establishment of a school where he could educate a new genera-
tion of young students in the autoemancipatory and self-reflec-
tive virtues he had espoused in his writings. In September 1863, 
115 boarders were admitted to his al-Madrasa al-Wataniyya—the 
“native Academy,” as suspicious American missionaries called the 
building in Zuqaq al-Bulat.32 Although some missionaries com-
plained that the school deprived the mission of its local teach-
ing staff, and that it was not linked to their Protestant work, Wil-
liam Thomson and Cornelius van Dyck—the “liberal caucus” 
among American missionaries—quickly realized the potential of 
al-Bustani’s institution:
The teachers are not allowed to impart religious instruction, but still it 
is an interesting fact that in a little over three years after the dreadful 
scenes of massacres and blood[shed] in 1860, there should be gathered in 
Beirut a school of 115 boarders composed of almost all the various sects 
in the land and that children of Moslem sheikhs and papal priests, and 
Druze okkals should study side by side… It is a promising fact, too, as 
bearing upon the future success of the college proposed to be opened in 
Beirut that the youth of Syria are willing to pay for education, and it is 
plain that the movement for a college started not a moment too soon.33
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The school was oriented toward teaching languages,  Arabic, 
and related disciplines, such as penmanship, translation, ele-
mentary jurisprudence, land surveying, and double-entry 
 bookkeeping, all handy subjects for the government service. 
The school’s opening caused huge distress among the Maronite 
clergy and  Protestant missionaries.34 Daniel Bliss, the presi-
dent of the  Syrian Protestant College (now the American Uni-
versity of Beirut) from 1866 to 1902, continued to question the 
benefit and efficacy of a school that functioned as a preparatory 
school for his college but displayed so little missionary zeal and 
taught more students French than  English. Efforts by the Syr-
ian Protestant mission’s board of directors to interfere with the 
curriculum of the National School and to impose conditions 
on Butrus al-Bustani ended in acrimony, and the  financial and 
institutional ties between the two schools were severed once 
and for all. Daniel Bliss  concluded that “we shall not consent to 
pay for anything we have not  absolute  control over.”35
In the few student recollections that exist, the school was 
remembered for its tolerance and the quality of its teachers. al-
Bustani recruited a dozen established literati and experienced 
educators for his school who shared the principle tenet that 
pupils should be accepted “from all sects, millets, and races with-
out discriminating against their personal beliefs or any attempt 
at proselytizing and [should be given] full license to carry out 
their religious duties.”36
In 1867, the teachers at al-Bustani’s National School were at 
the center of a new literary club for young thinkers. The Syrian 
Scientific Society constituted itself “for the spread knowledge, 
science, and arts.”37 With its well over one hundred members, 
the society was decidedly interconfessional, if not antisectar-
ian, and had a far greater outreach than its predecessors. Most 
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of the members were Beirutis in their early twenties, but its net-
work spanned from Istanbul to Damascus and Cairo. The club 
was again presided over by al-Bustani and his neighbor and 
future Ottoman parliamentarian Husayn Bayhum. Lectures 
included topics like Syrian archaeology and Greek philosophy, 
translations of the works of François Guizot, and al-tamaddun as 
 civilization and as Arab modernity. In its two-year existence, 
the society attempted to relate the past achievements of Arab 
civilization to modern Western science, sometimes narrated as a 
cultural debt owed to Arabs, sometimes as a call for reciprocity.
In the 1870s, al-Bustani expanded the reach of his ideological 
project by publishing what Tibawi wittily called a “horticultural 
trio” of journals: the monthly journal al-Jinan (The Gardens), 
al-Janna (Paradise), and al-Junayna (Little Garden).38 On the 
first page of its inaugural issue of al-Jinan, al-Bustani lays down 
his mission: al-Jinan wishes to “open the gates to the  gardens 
of knowledge and a space where the pens of the intellectuals 
. . . invite participation of elites and commoners in the circula-
tion of ideas and knowledge.”39 Paradise and garden, of course, 
share genealogical communalities. Both the Quran and the 
Bible describe paradise as a garden. But not all gardens repre-
sented the afterlife or were cosmic.40 The semantic recurrence 
of the garden/gardener in the Nahda (not just in Beirut but also 
in Istanbul, Cairo, and Baghdad) indexed a deeper discursive 
practice, a “botanical imagination” at the center of the collective 
effort to “curate” an ideal/Edenic political space and commu-
nity. In fact, between 1858 and 1900 dozens of Arabic newspapers 
across the Arab provinces of the Ottoman empire invoked the 
garden in one way or another.
al-Jinan, in particular, was a laboratory of social reform, 
self-criticism, and cultural revival for the growing numbers of 
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learned men and women in fin de siècle Beirut. Its serialized 
historical novels and editorials were public opinion–shap-
ing journalistic events around an urban network of correspon-
dents and readers in the Arabic-speaking Ottoman empire and 
North Africa. Beirut’s cultural production capitalized on an 
unprecedented global demand for Mt. Lebanon’s silk between 
the 1860s and the 1880s.41 Both fields of production, sericulture 
and  serialized novels published in journals, were economic and 
affective wagers on the future. Like al-Bustani’s most remark-
able intellectual feats—the Arabic lexicon, Muhit al-Muhit, and 
his epic work on the Arabic encyclopaedia, the multitomed 
Daʾ irat al-Maʿ arif—al-Jinan would have been financially incon-
ceivable without the economic optimism of the 1860s, reliant, as 
all projects were, on advance subscriptions by Arabic readers.42
al-Bustani’s reinvention as an encyclopaedist marks a wider 
shift in the Nahda. Nafir Suriyya was an urgent and immediate 
address to al-Bustani’s contemporaries and al-Jinan’s editorials 
no less impatiently repeatedly told its readers to swallow the 
bitter pill of self-reliance and autoemancipation. The lexico-
graphical project in the autumn of his life, however, operated 
on a different horizon of expectation and a much more long-
term frame of reform. Removed from the immediate concerns 
of social cohesion that had so animated Nafir Suriyya, al-Bustani 
was set on erecting a monument of modern Arabic philology 
for future generations. As he declared in the introduction to 
Muhit al-Muhit, he also saw his lexicon as an attempt to decenter 
“the Arabian Desert as the terra prima of Arabo-Islamic civiliza-
tion.”43 What was at stake in al-Bustani’s project was achieving 
Arab culture, literally word for word, in order to stem the per-
ceived loss of “pure Arabic” as much as to incorporate its Syriac 
and other Shami etymological legacies. This was all the more 
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urgent because, as Ahmad Faris al-Shidyaq intoned in his al-
Saq ʿala al-saq in 1855, “While the Europeans have acquired their 
 language from civilization, we have acquired our civilization 
from our language.”44
After 1860, al-Bustani saw his task as reconsidering that 
 civilization critically. Before we consider some key concepts 
in Nafir Suriyya and situate the claims about language and 
 civilization in chapter 5, the next chapter will provide a sketch 
of the place of Nafir Suriyya in modern Arab historiography.
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ch a p t e r 3
Nafir Suriyya in Arab 
Historiography
Jens hanssen
Early Arabic historiography of the Nahda focused largely on al-
Bustani as a pioneer of the Arab language reform and revival 
movement and paid more attention to his literary and scientific 
output than the less polished and more political Nafir Suriyya.1 
The latter’s pamphlet format has also made it an outlier in the 
historiography on early Arabic newspapers and journalism. But 
Arabic- and European-language literature did recognize the 
importance of Nafir Suriyya. Its interpretation has shifted over 
the course of the twentieth century. George Antonius’s founda-
tional study-turned-manifesto of Arab nationalism identified the 
pamphlets as the “the first germ of the national idea” in Syria:
It was a small weekly [sic] publication called The Clarion of Syria, the first 
political journal ever published in the country, and was mainly devoted 
to the preaching of concord between the different creeds and union in 
the pursuit of knowledge. For knowledge, he argued week after week in 
the earnest columns of his paper, leads to enlightenment; and enlighten-
ment, to the death of fanaticism and the birth of ideals held in common. 
A platitude perhaps, but one that Syria had not heard before, and which 
contained the germ of the national idea.2
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Albert Hourani echoed Antonius’s patriotic sentiments but 
insisted that al-Bustani “writes as an Ottoman subject, and there 
is no hint that he would wish to break away from loyalty to the 
sultan.” Instead, “his appeal is to those who belong to a smaller 
unit within the empire and, as with [the Egyptian reformer] 
Tahtawi, the unit is a territorial one.” In Hourani’s  interpretation, 
“ ‘Syria’ as a whole is his watan” and al-Bustani “is perhaps the 
first writer to speak of ‘Arab blood.’ If Syria was to flourish again, 
they must love her, and, what is no less urgent, they must be on 
friendly terms with each other.” Compared to other mid-nine-
teenth-century Arab intellectual giants, “al-Bustani lays his 
emphasis on religious freedom and equality, and mutual respect 
between those of different faiths.” Hourani explains this move 
with al-Bustani’s Protestant conversion, which he saw as a form 
of “self-exile [that] may well have turned his mind to the thought 
of some wider community to which he could belong.” al-Bustani 
distinguished “between two different types of religion: between 
the fanaticism (taʿ assub) which has ruined Syria, and the mutual 
respect between faiths which should exist and did once exist.” 
Finally, Hourani invokes al-Bustani’s belief in the emancipa-
tory potential of civilization: “If Syria is to be truly civilized, she 
needs two things from her rulers: just and equal laws suited to 
the times, looking to the matter at issue and not to the person, 
and based on a separation between religious and secular realms; 
and education in Arabic. Syria must not become a Babel of lan-
guages as she is a Babel of religions.”3
al-Bustani confessed how difficult it was to find the right 
words, language, and narrative to represent adequately what 
happened during the civil war and what it meant for the future. 
While his Khutba of 1859 and his Khitab of 1868 were originally 
delivered as scholarly lectures and retained the assertive style 
of a religious sermon in published versions, Nafir Suriyya cast 
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spells of doubt and constantly gestured toward the unknown 
and the conditionality of its truth claims.4 He categorized 
and divided the world into conceptual opposites—past/pres-
ent, religion/politics, civilization/barbarism, Europe/Africa, 
 victims/perpetrators, civil war/civil society. He separated the 
financial from the moral-cultural losses (al-khasaʾ ir al-adabiyya), 
and then all the losses from the potential gains. What may come 
across as the work of an accountant’s balance sheet is in fact 
part of al-Bustani’s broader approach to try to master, by way of 
 simplification, infinitely complex situations.5
Most historians of the Middle East have judged Nafir  Suriyya’s 
invocation of al-watan—patriotism—as articulating a protean 
form of twentieth-century Arab nationalisms. For some, since 
George Antonius and Albert Hourani, it was the source of prog-
ress and independence, while for its detractors it unleashed the 
destruction of an authentic political order where everyone had 
known their place.
Hourani’s Palestinian contemporaries Abdulatif Tibawi and 
Hisham Sharabi largely shared his interpretation of Nafir Suriyya 
as the work of an anguished Christian Arab of the modernizing 
Ottoman empire. An early historian of American missionaries 
in the Arab world, Tibawi noticed al-Bustani’s support for the 
Ottoman envoy Fu aʾd Pasha’s pacifying mission and argued that 
it was rooted in his “conflicting loyalties” to his former Maronite 
coreligionists in Mt. Lebanon, on the one hand, and the new 
Protestant and American community he served in Beirut, on 
the other. Although Tibawi demonstrated that al-Bustani had 
become somewhat estranged from the American mission by 
1860, he still considered Nafir Suriyya’s “gospel” style the prod-
uct of his evangelical milieu, living among American missionar-
ies.6 Sharabi, a Palestinian-American political scientist who had 
been an early member of the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party, 
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focused on Nafir Suriyya as an expression of Christian secular-
ism and emergent Syrian nationalism, and the unifying purpose 
of the Arabic language as “a common ground where Christian 
and Muslim could meet.”7
Hourani’s student, the late Butrus Abu-Manneh argued in 
his seminal study from 1980 on al-Bustani’s identitarian dis-
position that the promise of Ottoman liberal reform, religious 
equality, and  participatory rule enshrined in the Hatt-ı Hüma-
yun of 1856 “converted” him once more, this time to Ottoman-
ism. The  Ottoman reform decree convinced al-Bustani that 
the Ottoman state was the most reliable guarantor of bringing 
about a modern social order in Bilad al-Sham. Like his Pales-
tinian colleagues Tibawi and Sharabi, Abu Manneh identified 
historical Syria, not  Lebanon, as the cultural and national refer-
ent: “al-Bustani led the way culturally to Arabism, politically to 
Ottomanism, and inevitably to Syrian nationalism.”8
Following Lebanon’s descent into politically motivated sec-
tarian violence during the 1970s and 1980s, some historians 
reclaimed al-Bustani as a Lebanese patriot against the then 
dominant Syrianist appropriation.9 For the Arabic editor of Nafir 
Suriyya, Yusuf Quzma Khuri, al-Bustani was a “man before his 
age” who provided contemporary Lebanon with a blueprint 
for overcoming civil war.10 In the work of Ussama Makdisi, al-
Bustani and his Nafir Suriyya came to be recalibrated in the dis-
tinctly Lebanese context of coping with communal violence. 
Makdisi’s work combines Tibawi’s critique of the impact of 
missionaries on the Nahda with Abu Manneh’s interest in al-
Bustani’s Ottomanism.11 But according to Makdisi, the real les-
son contained in al-Bustani’s post-1860 thought was for Lebanon 
to learn: “al-Bustani asserted that the mixture of religion and 
politics would lead to an inflexible political system that could 
Nafir Suriyya in Arab Historiography / 39
not adapt to new realities, anticipating almost word for word 
modern-day criticisms of the sectarian political system that 
 dominates Lebanon.”12
In the aftermath of Syria’s descent into civil war and the har-
rowing refugee crisis today, Nafir Suriyya’s frame of reference 
reminds us that sectarian violence is not an isolated Lebanese 
phenomenon. al-Bustani himself alluded to the wider afflictions 
that had struck Aleppo in 1850, Nablus in 1856, and Damascus in 
1860.13 Indeed, the massacre of Christians in Bab Tuma—many 
of them refugees from Mt. Lebanon—had two contradictory 
effects. On the one hand, neither the Ottoman nor the  European 
 governments could treat the civil war in Mt. Lebanon in iso-
lation from Bilad al-Sham as a whole. On the other hand, the 
 massacres in Damascus reinforced Maronite claims of more 
general Muslim hostility against Christians. As Carol Hakim 
has pointed out, “the Damascus massacres obscured the specific 
political and socioeconomic factors of the outbreak of hostili-
ties in Lebanon and vindicated the view attributing them exclu-
sively to the baleful designs of an inflamed Muslim fanaticism.”14 
In this sense, Nafir Suriyya’s wider Bilad al-Sham lens designated 
not so much a modern—much less an ancient—possessive terri-
torial framework for the “Syrian nation” as the source of attach-
ment (what Nafir Suriyya refers to as “ ʿ illat al-dhamm”)15 whose 
members needed to band together and exchange violent strife 
with love for the homeland.
Since Makdisi’s important interventions, sectarianism, 
nationalism, and secularism no longer appear in English histori-
ography as conceptual rivals or stages of historical development 
but as dialectically conditioning one another under the sign of 
colonial modernity. Makdisi defines sectarianism as “a process 
through which a kind of religious identity is politicized, even 
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secularized, as part of a .  .  . struggle for power.”16 He subjected 
Ottoman pacification of provincial protests and insurrections to 
a colonial discourse analysis and coined the concept of “Otto-
man Orientalism.”17 Makdisi’s rereading of Nafir Suriyya con-
trasts al-Bustani’s understanding of the civil war in 1860 in Mt. 
Lebanon and his vision of “future’s past” to those of the Otto-
man special envoy Fu aʾd Pasha. There were competing political 
agendas between al-Bustani’s advocacy of citizenship and the 
authoritarian Ottomanism of Fu aʾd Pasha at play:
Despite their advocacy of Syrian patriotism and Ottoman nationalism, 
respectively, both interpreted and judged within fundamentally 19th 
century notions of progress. In other words, they both explicitly resisted 
European imperialism at the same time that they deployed a discourse 
of national and tribal time, which was itself based on European colonial-
ist thinking that divided the world into advanced and backward nations, 
peoples, and tribes.  .  .  . [al-Bustani] anticipated a question central to 
non-Western historiography: is it possible to represent an indigenous 
national past using a decidedly Eurocentric notion of modernity?18
Most recently, Makdisi argued that al-Bustani’s Arab  civilizing 
discourse and his notion of freedom of consciousness was 
inspired by Protestant ethics and Christian salvific traditions. 
al-Bustani challenged both the American missionaries’ exclu-
sionary and deeply racist conceptions of Protestant cultural 
superiority and the homegrown sense of sectarian supremacy 
espoused by the Maronite clergy. Against such intolerance, Nafir 
Suriyya stood out for the way it charted a modern path of hybrid 
identity, equality, and coexistence that allowed for “multiple 
forms of religiosity.”19
Stephen Sheehi, by contrast, reads Nafir Suriyya as an illus-
tration of the literary and rhetorical construction of modern 
Arab identity. The framework of critical Nahda studies Sheehi 
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 established enabled him to take al-Bustani and his Nafir Suriyya 
out of the Syro-Lebanese geographic and discursive  confines 
and bring both into conversation with intellectual production 
in Egypt and the wider Arabic-speaking world. Sheehi is critical 
of al-Bustani’s writings that he regards as manifestations of the 
Nahda’s bourgeois sensibilities.  Frequently, the social and cul-
tural critique al-Bustani offered his compatriots bore the hall-
marks of internalized Orientalism and self-colonization. But 
a respectfully close, Bakhtinian reading of al-Bustani’s three 
most important reform texts—Khutba fi adab al- Aʿrab (1859), Nafir 
Suriyya, and Khitab fi al-hayʾ a al-ijtimaʿ iyya (1868)—reveal his and 
other Nahdawis’ double consciousness,20 the desire to be recog-
nized by the West as equal and coeval on the one hand and a 
desire to be essentially, indeed, authentically, different.
While al-Bustani’s Khutba idealized the Arabic literary past, 
and his later Khitab were delivered as assertive sermons that 
measured Arab culture against the ideal of the West, Nafir 
Suriyya’s probing exhortative style and direct appeal to “native 
sons” and “fellow countrymen” of “Syria” represented an incite-
ment to subjective and individual reform among its readers. 
Nafir Suriyya’s rhetoric distinguished between two groups of 
“compatriots,” enlightened or reformable selves and ignorant 
and fanatical ones. But this gulf was not absolute; it could be 
overcome if the latter returned to the fold through love and 
forgiveness for the greater good of political unity and social 
concord.21 By highlighting the text’s affective registers, Sheehi 
presents al-Bustani’s civilizing project as a tentative and frag-
ile process of nationalism. al-Bustani’s vocabulary of social 
analysis—contagion, anxiety, and barbarism—certainly casts 
him as a liberal thinker, but not as a heroic, visionary intellec-
tual pioneer. Rather he appears as someone driven by fear of 
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social transgression and by  bourgeois intolerance of subaltern 
mobilization.22
Nafir Suriyya continues to animate debates about the origins 
of Arab nationalism. Most recently, Nadia Bou Ali has read the 
civil war in 1860 as a disruption that “the forces of capitalism 
and the shifting relations of production in Levantine society 
induced,” before positing Nafir Suriyya as an affective response 
for coping with the socioeconomic fallout. According to this 
interpretation, al-Bustani read the civil war as a manifestation of 
cultural atavism that deprived hardworking individuals of their 
rewards and civil society of its promise. al-Bustani’s translation-
adaptation of Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe, which he published 
in 1861, has received considerable scholarly attention recently to 
serve as a key for a new understanding of al-Bustani’s postwar 
reform project.23 While for Maya Kesrouany, al-Bustani’s version 
of Robinson Crusoe offers insights into the relationship between 
Lebanese nationalism and the Nahda’s translation movement, for 
Bou Ali al-Bustani’s Crusoe offered a capitalist work ethic that 
modeled the feeling of guilt and sense of morality of every com-
patriot on the feats of the novel’s shipwrecked protagonist.24 Bou 
Ali argued that “the trope of crisis is the founding and founda-
tional episteme of the nation form for the Arabs.”25 If al-Bustani 
conceived the nation form through an act of translation, it is 
borne out of a postwar state of emergency in which “the liberal 
subject is construed on a splitting between a demonized self and 
an innocent ‘we.’ ”26
Elizabeth Holt has recently picked up the idea of a capital-
ism-induced cultural crisis in her monograph Fictitious  Capital: 
Silk, Cotton and the Rise of the Arabic Novel. Drawing on Fawaz (1983), 
Labaki (1984), Khater (2001), Hanssen (2005b), and  Kornbluh 
(2013), she argues that the emergence of the serialized Arabic 
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novel on the pages of the Bustanis’ newspapers contains liter-
ary representations—in content and form—of economic devel-
opments in Beirut, Mt. Lebanon, and Bilad al-Sham. The Otto-
man-European free trade agreements between 1838 and 1840 set 
the stage for the influx of European commodities and capital. 
The silk trade took off in earnest when French investors indus-
trialized Lebanese sericulture in the aftermath of the 1860 civil 
war of 1860. Capital was accumulating in the 1860s in Beirut, 
benefiting international but also local financiers.27 She insists, 
however, that the 1860s were a period of cultural optimism. 
The literary expressions of crisis only set in with the economic 
downturn in the 1870s:
By the early summer of 1870, . . . hopeful plotlines were undermined by 
the suspense charted not only at the level of form, each serialized install-
ment ever asking readers to wait: the remainder was yet to come, but also 
by the historical conjuncture, a moment when the very unruliness of 
global—here especially French—capital was profiting at a quickening 
pace off the risks entailed in financing and speculating in silk moths and 
mulberry orchards.28
In Iterations of Loss: Mutilation and Aesthetic Form, al-Shidyaq to 
Darwish Jeffrey Sacks explores the destructive character of the 
Nahda’s attempt to find an adequate language, to institutional-
ize Arabic literature, and to adapt Arabic philology in order to 
meet the political, economic, juridical, and cultural challenges 
of colonial modernity.29 Under the slogan of “Awake ye Arabs 
Awake,” Nahdawis assumed the role of guardians of the Arab 
future.30 But with some few exceptions, like al-Bustani’s nem-
esis, Ahmad Faris al-Shidyaq (1804–87), they struggled with the 
sense of loss. The textual and architectural ruins of past gran-
deur all around, they asked themselves, where are we today, 
and what have we missed during our “ignorance” and “slumber” 
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all these centuries? al-Bustani’s writings offered a “simplified” 
 Arabic language that could curate, in anthropocentric fashion, 
the once-glorious past, capture the ominous signs of the  present, 
and project a better, albeit uncertain, future. And yet, with this 
ability came the mournful realization that “man’s” philological 
mastery reduced Arabic to serving human utility and to curtail-
ing “the iterative dimensions of language, which give language 
to exceed both itself and its time.”31
45
ch a p t e r 4
Toward a Conceptual History 
of Nafir Suriyya
Jens hanssen
Both words of the title of al-Bustani’s pamphlets require inves-
tigation, as well as his definition of them as wataniyyat : What did 
he mean by nafir and what would have been its connotations? 
And what did Suriyya mean to al-Bustani and his generation? 
Was it a description of a real territory or a potentiality? al-Nafir 
and Suriyya are terms that go back to antiquity, but neither had 
much traction outside liturgical literature until contact with 
Protestant missionaries gave them new political valence.
al-Nafīr means “clarion” or “trumpet,” which was perhaps 
so self-evident that al-Bustani did not explain the term in his 
pamphlets.1 But in Muhit al-Muhit, he dedicated almost an entire 
page to the different declinations and meanings of the root n-f-r 
(from the “bolting of a mare,” to “raising of troops,” “the fugi-
tive,” “estrangement,” and “mutual aversion”), before defin-
ing al-nafir itself: “someone enlisted in a group or cause,” and 
“al-nafir al-ʿam means mass mobilization to combat the enemy.” 
The Protestant convert al-Bustani also lists yawm al-nafir 
( Judgment Day)2 and informs the reader that al-nafir is also a 
 trumpet or fanfare (al-buq)3 containing associations with Israfil, 
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the archangel of death alluded to in the Bible and the Quran.4 
Then he mentions Nafir Suriyya itself as a set of “meditations 
on the events of 1860  published in eleven issues that we called 
wataniyyat.” Like many historians before us, we translate the 
term as “ clarion” in order to capture both the apocalyptic mood 
of the text and the author’s passionate call for social concord and 
overcoming adversity.5
At first sight, the term Suriyya is less complex. After all, al-
Bustani defined the territory as Barr al-Sham and Arabistan, 
two Ottoman terms for what later Syrian nationalists considered 
Greater Syria. But al-Bustani did not give clear boundaries for 
this land except to lament in issue 5 that “Syria lies between 
two countries [Egypt and Turkey] that have often pulled it in 
different directions.” So why did he replace Barr, or Bilad al-
Sham, the common referent for Ottoman Syria, with the ancient 
Hebrew and Latinate term Syria?6 In his Khutba of 1859, he had 
delineated the essence of and threats to Arab culture, but he 
made no reference to Syria. Nafir Suriyya was the first instance 
where al-Bustani annunciated “ancient Syria” as a parameter of 
identity, as a benchmark for contemporary Syrians and a source 
of social unity.7
The political semantics first began to shift from Bilad—or 
Barr—al-Sham and Arabistan to Syria during the Egyptian 
occupation from 1831 to 1840.8 Nafir Suriyya’s paradigmatic adop-
tion of “Suriyya” very likely stems from its author’s contact with 
American missionaries, particularly Eli Smith. In 1833, the same 
year Nasif al-Yaziji wrote his Historical Treatise on the Conditions 
of Mount Lebanon in Its Feudal Age, Smith had defined Syria as the 
“general name for the country that lies along the whole breadth 
of the Eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea, extending inland to 
the deserts of Arabia, and having the territories of Egypt on the 
south, and the river Euphrates with the mountains of Cilicia on 
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the north.”9 From the first literary society al-Bustani cofounded 
with Eli Smith in 1847 to Daniel Bliss’s Syrian  Protestant  College 
in 1866, the Americans propagated a Syrianist imagination that 
was conspicuously at odds with  Muslim,  Ottoman, and Lebanist 
geographical imaginations.
Nafir Suriyya contained many ideas about Syria that were 
already expressed in Beirut’s first privately run newspaper, 
 Hadiqat al-Akhbar. Its editor-in-chief, Khalil Khuri (1836–1907), 
was al-Bustani’s neighbor, a noted fiction writer, and an amateur 
historian.10 His book Kharabat Suriyya, the Ruins of Syria (1861) was 
the first in Arabic to use Syria in the title of a major Nahda pub-
lication and drew on archaeological texts of the early mission-
aries and adopted their mournfulness about current day Syria: 
“Where are the temples of Baalbak and Jerusalem? Where is the 
royal purple of Tyre? Where are the workshops of Saida and 
the academies of Beirut? . . . All is long gone.”11 The missionaries 
had set out to reclaim the Holy Land but instead of returning to 
the roots of Christianity, they ended up in Beirut, where con-
tact with its inhabitants, particularly the literary figures, and the 
civil war of 1860 forced them to adjust their preconceived ideas.12 
One of Nafir Suriyya’s remarkable features was how it turned the 
experience of violence and loss—without diminishing it—into 
a calling for hope that even American missionaries came around 
to adopting. It is in this sense of forging a Syrian community of 
suffering that the idea of patriotism with all its contradictions—
“it repeats the event it wishes only to have described”—was 
born.13
Subsequent local historians of the “Syrian nation,” start-
ing with Elias Matar (1874), Jurji Yanni (1881), and Yusuf Dibs 
(1893–1905), elided “Syria’s” “baptism of fire” of 1860 and tele-
scoped deep into the past.14 Like Khuri and al-Bustani, they did 
so relying largely on European literature.15 What changed was 
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the emergence of geographical determinism. It had its  origins in 
French cartography and archaeology, particularly Elisée  Reclus’s 
influential Nouvelle géographie universelle (1884) and  Victor Bérad’s 
Les Phéniciens et l’Odysée (1902), and was popularized in Beirut by 
the Jesuit geographer and historian Henri Lammens (1862–1937). 
The geographical determinism of these geographers and their 
students at the Université de St. Joseph was  Islamophobic and 
anti-Ottoman. It conjured up Syria as a distinctly Christian 
and non-Arab territorial entity in which “ Lebanon is for Syria 
what the Nile River is for Egypt.”16 These early expressions of 
 Syrianism and Lebanism had much in common with each other 
but little with those of the Bustanis. These exclusivist ideas 
were an anathema to the pre-Mandate Nahda.
Only when the Ottoman decentralization movement and 
Arab nationalism challenged both Phoenicianism and the 
 Syrian antiquity narrative after the Young Turk Revolution of 
1908 did Syrian and Lebanese nationalisms start to move apart 
and compete with each other.17 Syrian nationalists challenged 
the old narrative that Syrians were Christian. They insisted 
that Syrians were Arabs and began to claim that Damascus was 
“the beating heart of Arabism.” Since the political  turbulence 
following the end of Ottoman rule, most articulations and 
explorations of Arab nationalisms have focused on their trans-
formation from “birth” to maturation to aberration, apogee, 
or “death.” This diachronic scheme charts the transition from 
 territory-based patriotism to ethnocentric nationalism, i.e., 
from  nineteenth-century wataniyya to twentieth-century qaw-
miyya. If al-qawmiyya came to challenge the colonial division of 
the Arab nation in the twentieth century, it also criticized the 
alleged parochialism of wataniyya formations.18 These later con-
ceptual battles were not al-Bustani’s problem space. His idea of 
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Syria was unencumbered by colonial and nationalist occupation 
with the geographic form of the nation, border drawing, and 
demographic exclusions. Rather, he was preoccupied with the 
 constitution of a transcendent harmonious community.
al-Watan was the central concept throughout Nafir Suriyya. 
But in Clarion 5, a new sociological concept appeared for the first 
time, al-jinsiyya: the new “the source of attachment .  .  . is kin-
ship (al-jinsiyya).” In this passage, al-Bustani laments the way 
in which the resurgence of prejudice (al-gharadh) against other 
groups has shifted from an interfactional designation of us ver-
sus them to one based on hitherto “sacred names, . . . like Druze 
and Christian, then Muslim and Christian.” al-Jinsiyya has come 
to mean nationality and the normative source of attachment to 
the independent nation-state. al-Bustani’s al-Jinan, Ahmad Faris 
al-Shidyaq’s al-Jawa’ib, and other journals that cropped up from 
the 1870s onward first willed the semantic shift from  kinship to 
nationality.19 They understood that language can formulate new 
political communities.
al-Jinsiyya, an abstract noun derived from al-jins, occupies cen-
ter stage in Nafir Suriyya starting from the November 1860 Clarion, 
notably when the discussion shifts from Syria to Arab culture: 
“we advise you to avoid this natural inclination to  condemn an 
entire race [al-jins] and to attack it because of the failings of some 
of its members.” al-Jins, too, has undergone significant shifts in 
meaning since al-Bustani penned Nafir  Suriyya.20 The abstract 
noun of janasa (to make alike, to classify, to assimilate), al-jins has 
been around since early Arabic literature. But in the context of 
racial stereotyping, it was of recent coinage, and al-Bustani may 
have been alerted by American missionaries’ discourse on the 
Arabs. For example, Eli Smith invoked al-jins al-ʿarabi in a lec-
ture to one of al-Bustani’s new cultural societies in 1849. The fact 
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that al-Bustani speaks of a “natural inclination” suggests that jins 
may not have referred to a new concept imported by foreigners 
but was likely a new term for an existing concept.
Nahdawis and missionaries alike believed that people could 
escape racial stereotypes. The particularly brutal history of rac-
ism in the Americas along with insights of the twentieth cen-
tury spawned anticolonial theorists and critical race theorists. 
al-Bustani, by contrast, did not have the vocabulary to challenge 
racism itself. So, instead of challenging the epistemic Eurocen-
trism of his times, he advocated a program to improve the destiny 
of Arab society and individuals and adapt to new conditions. The 
concepts central to this undertaking were al-adab and al-tamaddun.
Today’s Arabic readers know adab as “literature.”21 In classi-
cal Arabic al-adab’s semantic range included sophisticated hab-
its, good behavior, and the ability to fulfill one’s role in soci-
ety, a sense it retains today negatively in the phrase qalil al-adab 
(uncouth) and positively in muʾ addab (polite). In al-Bustani’s 
times, al-adab was located somewhere between morals (al-
akhlaq) and education (al-taʿ lim). The former had ethical reso-
nances in Islamic political philosophy while the latter denoted 
the Nahda’s mantra of public education, expressed by al-Bustani 
in his lecture “On the Education of Women,” written in 1849. 
Neither alternative term appears in Nafir Suriyya—al-Bustani 
used akhlaq only once, in his follow-up article “Patriotism is an 
Element of Faith” in al-Jinan, published in 1870. In his lecture 
on ādāb al- Aʿrab, published in 1859, al-Bustani gestured toward 
the academic concept of the “Arab humanities” in the plural of 
al-adab—“the subject is ādāb al- Aʿrab, or the sciences (al-ʿulum), 
arts (al-funun), or knowledge (al-maʿ arif) of the Arabs.”22 But 
most translations, correctly, render the title as “the culture of 
the Arabs.”23 In Nafir Suriyya the meaning of al-adab is some-
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what different from that in his lecture a year before; the empha-
sis is more on lessons learned from the mistakes of belligerent 
human behavior and collective “unbridled passions.” In this 
context, moral and morals seem to have a more apt connotation 
in our translation of al-adab/adabi than the semantics of culture 
and cultural.24
al-Bustani dedicated issue 11 of Nafir Suriyya to the  desirability 
and acquirability of civilization.25 In this final patriotic pamphlet, 
al-Bustani sets out to differentiate the population, between those 
who merit the homeland and the reforms he advocated, on the 
one hand, and those who disqualify themselves by their unwor-
thy deeds, on the other. Drawing on Ibn Khaldun, he claims that 
al-tamaddun (civilization) is derived from the word madina (city) 
and “opposed to the lifestyle of the Bedouins who lack civiliza-
tion.” “The natural state into which man is born is barrenness” 
but with innovation, hard work, and diligence one can achieve 
the highest standards of civilization. In many ways, al-Bustani 
shared Matthew Arnold’s conservative, if not elitist, definition 
of culture as “the study of harmonious human perfection.”26
Adopting the racist taxonomy of Western missionaries, al-
Bustani holds that half way between the “cannibals of distant 
Africa” and the “dignitaries of Paris and England,” the fault line 
between barbarity and civilization passes right through Syria 
between “the Arab inhabitants of the desert and the inhabit-
ants of Beirut.” But “genuine civilization is that state of social 
organization which suits the development of all forces of the 
human race, individually and collectively.” If everybody was to 
be brought into the national fold and given the chance at civili-
zation, the prospective nation would be a distinctly urban uto-
pia. Stereotypical Arab Bedouins, however, remain a constant 
menace and anxiety-inducing threats of civilizational relapse.
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Culture-talk and clash-of-civilization narratives have 
haunted the West and the Middle East since civilization first 
entered the Orientalist paradigm in the early nineteenth 
 century.27 But, as Peter Hill reminds us, the Arab discourse on 
civilization changed even during al-Bustani’s lifetime. In fact, 
there was a significant shift between Khalil Khuri’s use of tama-
ddun in the late 1850s and the invocations in Nafir Suriyya that 
reflects an intellectual crisis of confidence in al-Bustani, precip-
itated by the war of 1860. While the owner of Hadiqat al-Akhbar 
expressed optimism for the “new age” and autogenetic attain-
ability of the highest stages of “civilization,” the author of the 
“Lecture on the Culture of the Arabs” and Nafir Suriyya was not 
so sanguine about the prospects of cultural refinement alone and 
insisted that in the current global competitiveness, no culture is 
an island. By the 1870s the meaning of being a civilized compa-
triot had consolidated around the mastery of synthesis of essen-
tial Arab qualities and contingent European accomplishments.28
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ch a p t e r 5
Wataniyya as Antidote to 
Sectarianism
Jens hanssen
Come let us join together, O brothers
By commitment and faith allied to one another
Giving ourselves, our devotion to show,
So rise oh heroes! To the battle now go . . .
Love of birthplaces [al-awtan] is an article of faith.
—al-Tahtawi, Wataniyyat, 18551
When the Orientalist Bernard Lewis lamented that the word 
watan—though apparently inferior to European and Islamic 
cognates like la patrie and Vaterland, al-umma and al-milla—had 
helped destroy “the universal Islamic monarchy of the  Turkish 
sultans,” his Ottoman nostalgia meant to dismiss the “patch-
work quilt of soi-disant nation-states” that gained independence 
in the mid-twentieth century.2 What interests us, by contrast, 
is how national historians sought to convince their own emer-
gent constituencies that geographically ill-defined terms mat-
tered and corresponded to distinct territories of belonging and 
attachment. For if “Syria” and “Lebanon” became imaginable 
national territories in the twentieth century, it was not because 
Europeans invented them. From the perspective of conceptual 
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history, the term that came to challenge religious visions of 
colonial and imperial rule was al-watan.
Hindsight has given at once too much and too little credit 
to al-Bustani’s conceptual innovations.3 al-Bustani’s particular 
use of language and history in Nafir Suriyya was triggered by the 
event of the civil war. For him the issue was less to determine the 
(Christian) essence and cultural ownership of Syria, as franco-
phone scholars associated with the Jesuits in Beirut did. Rather 
al-Bustani championed a transconfessional contract where all of 
Syria’s religious communities were equal before Ottoman law, 
everyone felt included but also knew their place. It was in this 
context that he decided to dust off the term al-watan—“the most 
pleasant derivative word adorning the  Arabic language”—in 
favor of available, but by now differently connoted, alternatives.4 
By choosing watan al-Bustani effectively avoided what Koselleck 
called in the European context “the diachronic semantic thrust 
of theological” alternatives and steered his ecumenical messian-
ism toward love of the homeland.5  Conversely, only the nation 
form would enable ecumenical religiosity. Invested with new 
political meaning, particularly in relation to the forces that he 
posited had given rise to the civil war (forces that only much 
later acquire the seemingly stable label of “sectarianism”), the 
introduction of al-watan and the attachment to it, hubb al-watan, 
then was a conscious political act with a view to set the agenda 
for how the event should be interpreted and how to frame the 
future of his afflicted society.
Prior to the civil war in 1860, al-watan had already under-
gone significant semantic transformation. al-watan had traveled 
from al-Jahiz’s (d. 869) famous, if contested, treatise al-Hanin ila 
al-awtan (Longing for one’s homelands) to the great dictionar-
ies of Ibn Manzur (d. 1311–12), to Lisan al- Aʿrab, and to Murtada 
al-Zabidi’s Taj al- Aʿrus (1770s–80s).6 These and other instances 
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awtan (pl. of watan) implied one’s home, the place of birth or res-
idence. Ottoman sultans and Persian shahs may have deployed 
the term to belittle their rivals or regional insurgencies.7 But the 
term did not feature in the Circle of Justice or any of the Advice 
to the Prince literature.8
Ottoman diplomats stationed in Paris during the French 
Revolution experimented with translating the republican  slogan 
patrie but were reluctant to endorse it given the threat such con-
cepts posed to their young sultan.9 If the choice of translation fell 
on vatan, it may have still had the earlier negative  connotations of 
the enemy’s parochialism. But when foreign minister and former 
Ottoman ambassador to Paris, Mustafa Reşid Pasha (1800–1858), 
famously announced that the state henceforth would “guarantee 
insuring to our subjects perfect security for life, honor, and for-
tune” in the Gülhane Reform Edict of 1839, he also called upon 
all Ottomans to help “defend the vatan.”10 This inaugural event 
of the Tanzimat, then, deployed the term much like al-Bustani 
would in Nafir Suriyya: as an ennobling concept of attachment 
and a political field of rights and duties.
Rifʿat al-Rifaʿ i al-Tahtawi (1801–73) was more attracted to the 
July 1830 Revolution in general and the patriotism it espoused 
in particular than the Ottoman eyewitnesses of the French 
 Revolution had been in Paris in the 1790s.11 Having spent 1826 
to 1831 in France, he chronicled the overthrow of the Bourbon 
monarchy and diligently translated the new French Consti-
tutional  Charter, including most elements of the Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789.12 At a time when his 
patron, the ruler of Egypt Mehmed Ali Pasha, began challeng-
ing the authority of the Ottoman sultan, culminating in his mil-
itary campaign in Bilad al-Sham, al-Tahtawi could imbue his 
writings with a critique of the injustices of the Bourbon Res-
toration and the excesses of monarchical rule more generally. 
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Geopolitics aside, the sense of cultural recovery and political 
reclamation that undergirded the writings and translations by 
Nahda figures like al-Tahtawi and al-Bustani also predisposed 
them to the spirit of the rights of man, social justice, and free-
dom of conscience expressed in the French Revolution.13
The Egyptian’s wataniyya quotation at the beginning of this 
chapter suggests a kind of law of nature that required no further 
elaboration as to why and how this patriotic love works to be 
part of—much less an enactment of—faith, or, indeed, the faith. 
For all his appropriations of French Enlightenment thought, al-
Tahtawi did not develop the concept of hubb al-watan until his 
late works.14 By this time he had developed neo-Platonic and 
Hobbesian ideas of the state as the embodiment of the watan, 
a human organism in which the head represents the sovereign, 
the organs the government, and the limbs the military. While 
for al-Tahtawi Egypt’s territoriality appeared as a fact of natural 
history, the function of the Arabic language was to raise faith in 
the modern state.15
Arguably, the relationship between territoriality, the state, 
and the Arabic language was far more fraught in Nafir Suriyya 
than in al-Tahtawi’s writings, and it is to al-Bustani’s credit that 
he openly grappled with these tensions. al-Bustani addressed 
his readers as abnaʾ  al-watan—compatriots—which we render as 
“countrymen” in our translation, and signed each of the eleven 
issues of Nafir Suriyya anonymously as a muhibb al-watan—“a 
lover of the homeland,” or “a patriot.” Here and in Muhit al-
Muhit he called his pamphlets wataniyyat. As with the ascription 
for his pamphlets, al-Bustani adopted one of the Nahda’s key slo-
gans—“Love of the homeland is an element of faith” (hubb al-
watan min al-iman)—from Tahtawi’s wataniyyat, perhaps because 
they were reproduced in Hadiqat al-Akhbar in the late 1850s.16 Like 
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al-Tahtawi, al-Bustani claimed that the aphorism had hadith sta-
tus.17 The Quranic term al-iman incorporates both the act and 
the content of faith.18 For al-Bustani patriotism demanded a leap 
of faith, a commitment to loyalty even in adversity. Yet, he was 
mindful of any fatalism that this kind of faith might generate.
Perhaps quoting from Surat al-Raʿ d, al-Bustani reminded his 
readers that “God will not change the state of a people unless 
they change themselves.” In other words, mere faith in the 
homeland was not sufficient. What is required is something 
much more proactive: love.19 al-Hubb is juxtaposed to all the ills 
of his society: selfishness, revengefulness, fanaticism, and idle-
ness; but it also did work that no amount of international pity 
and charity could provide. Based on al-iman, love is “the mag-
net” that attracted diverse people to their homeland. Selfless, or 
 unselfish, love must conquer the violent passions and rein in its 
ignorant perpetrators so that the homeland can guarantee ecu-
menical religiosity in this “Babel of religions, races, and confes-
sions” that was “Syria.”20
In Nafir Suriyya, al-Bustani recognized that “patriotism is 
an element of faith” was a concept liable to usurpation and 
abuse. But it was his nemesis, Ahmad Faris al-Shidyaq, who 
launched a blistering critique of “the false patriot.” The false 
patriot would extol the virtues of the homeland, its natural 
beauty, its culture, and its history but would have nothing but 
contempt for his neighbors and compatriots, all the while recit-
ing “to love one’s homeland is part of faith.” Shidyaq charged 
that there were very few patriots whose concern for the coun-
try was genuine. But when these few criticized their compatri-
ots, they would do so as “kind educators and tender guardians.” 
For them “life is not enjoyable if wealth is not shared by all.” If 
“some people praise without being really concerned and some 
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are concerned without praise,” Shidyaq deemed “the  latter 
are better.”21
Shidyaq may have considered al-Bustani a “kind educa-
tor,” given how Nafir Suriyya insisted that “the secret lies in 
the dweller—not the house.”22 The affective registers of loy-
alty that his pamphlets articulated did not just echo the official 
 Tanzimat discourse emanating from Istanbul. They were signifi-
cantly altered: whereas Ottoman and Egyptian reform discourse 
offered subjects (riʿaya) equality in return for loyalty to the state, 
al-Bustani’s hubb-al-watan, “patriotism,” most powerfully artic-
ulated in the fourth issue of Nafir Suriyya, promoted a contract 
of rights and duties between the inhabitants and their home-
land. What mattered most was not the state but “the welfare of 
the homeland.” The role of the state was important but exter-
nal to the contract itself. This shift challenged the traditional 
legal concept of subject, raʿ iyya (pl. al-riʿaya), and Nafir Suriyya 
issued the term only once.23 Instead he often used the religiously 
inflected ʿibad (subjects), ahali (commoners), or bani (folks) and 
their derivatives, which were popular in Bilad al-Sham but had 
no legal standing. Nor did he speak of or for al-shaʿ ab—the con-
cept of “the people” emerged in Arabic political discourse only 
after 1862;24 he also introduced the liberal concept of al-insan—
the human being—which came to acquire legal status in interna-
tional law and human rights discourse in the twentieth century.
The “compatriots” were divided into two types: the ʿuqalaʾ , 
the responsible thinkers, and the awbash, the hoodlums who 
“trade patriotism for fanaticism and sacrifice the well-being of 
the homeland for personal interests.”25 Although they did not 
“deserve to belong to the homeland,” the whole reason for the 
anguished patriotism al-Bustani expressed in Nafir Suriyya was 
that, by hook or by crook, warts and all, all compatriots are in it 
together. As Bou Ali has put it, drawing on Lauren Berlant, “love 
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as a political rhetoric meant [for al-Bustani] to empower the 
national subject while acknowledging the ill-fate of  belonging 
to a nation.”26
The way love and faith sustained al-watan in Nafir Suri-
yya worked both on a biographical and on a societal level. For 
al-Bustani, the religious transgressor and cultural reformer, 
al-watan promised a secure space against violent passions and 
social apathy. Internal exile played a crucial role in al-Bustani’s 
political imagination as he reclaimed personal as well as politi-
cal sovereignty through the concept of al-watan. As a convert, 
he knew that identities were not fixed, and as a teacher with an 
evangelical disposition, he believed that people could overcome 
even their most basic instincts.
first expressions of antisectarianism?
There is a difference between someone who identifies 
prejudices and someone who identifies with a 
prejudice.
—Salim al-Bustani, “al-Gharadh,” 
al-Jinan (1870)
The most urgent task Butrus al-Bustani set himself with Nafir 
Suriyya was to name and shame the condition that stood in the 
way of patriotism and led to the violence. This task was all 
the more difficult because, for all his interest in the social—
he coined the term al-hayʾ a al-ijtimaʿ iyya here—the concept of 
sectarianism did not exist yet, neither as a principle of rule nor 
as one of social critique. al-Taʾ ifiyya—the abstract noun for the 
Lebanese system of sectarian political representation—was 
introduced much later and institutionalized only in the French 
Mandate period.27 In Nafir Suriyya, the noun taʾ ifa/tawaʾ if con-
tended with others and first appeared in al-Bustani’s analysis 
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only in relation to well-organized and productive animal col-
lectives—ants, bees, and silkworms.28 In the last three issues, 
al-taʾ ifi/al-taʾ ifiyya appear as adjectives among others—like per-
sonal (shakhsi, nafsani, dhati), familial (ʿaʾ ili), and confessional 
(madhhabi)—to specify the scourges of enmities (ʿadawat), fac-
tionalisms (tahazzubat), self-interests (ghayat).
It was the noun al-gharadh (pl. al-aghradh) that appeared 
most frequently and most unexpectedly in those passages in 
which al-Bustani grappled with what we today call sectarian-
ism.29 We consider gharadh/aghradh to designate sectarianism as 
understood today, but in order to avoid overdetermination, we 
decided to translate the term in the context of how al-Bustani 
used it, as blind “prejudice” in favor of some predetermined 
group identity or, in some instances where political factionalism 
is explicitly invoked, as partisanship. If, as Kosellek has argued, 
history does not depend on language to happen, then sectarian-
ism can exist avant le mot. al-Bustani explained the “fanaticism” 
and “factionalism” that led to the civil war as surface phenom-
ena unleashed because Syrians “surrendered” to their “preju-
dices.” But identifying gharadh/aghradh as the ultimate causa-
tion, his analysis remained limited to flaws in individual human 
behavior: unwillingness to reflect on the consequences of one’s 
action, and the betrayal of traditions of neighborliness, as well 
as the epoch-defining spirit of altruism, public welfare, and 
civic responsibility. If secularism became the dominant pana-
cea of sectarianism in the twentieth century, al-Bustani advo-
cated a return to “true religion.”30
The year 1860 continued to haunt the Beiruti Nahda long 
after al-Bustani stopped writing his pamphlets, and al-gharadh 
remained a conspicuous category of analysis to explain the vio-
lence in terms of “uncontrolled human instincts.” In a lengthy 
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article for al-Jinan his son Salim al-Bustani revisited al-gharadh 
with the passionate introspection that characterized many of his 
fictional writings. Although he returned to many of Nafir Suri-
yya’s themes, he was much less evangelical in his editorials than 
his father had been. It had been a decade since the civil war. The 
Ottomans had pacified Bilad al-Sham and economic and cul-
tural life had resumed in Beirut, and he expressed frustration 
that partisanship and prejudices persisted. In fact, he realized 
that as soon as someone “defames” him with “spears of reproach” 
for his writings, he blames it on “ugly prejudice in his bile.” 
He  wondered if this response made him any better than those 
he criticized. How could he escape the temptation or charge of 
prejudice and partisanship if he and his father were so harsh in 
their judgment of their compatriots? Did patriotism not engen-
der new forms of harmful passions? Having set up the problem 
as a bodily condition—located in the bile—the article justified 
their social criticism. Being partial to the common good is noble 
but “the hero of the age is patient in all situations.” Still, preju-
dice against the “conscripts” of partisanship was legitimate. “The 
quality of rational persons depends on their ability to consider 
time and place” both in praise and in condemnation. “Prejudice” 
may have many sources: “profit, kinship, love, loss, hatred, envy, 
proclivity for revenge, religion, conditions of race, and distress.” 
Some are good and necessary. For example, “if one tribe attacks 
another, the defending tribe must adhere to gharadh in order to 
defend oneself in a unified way.” In such instances gharadh is best 
rendered as “personal interest.” But generally, Salim al-Bustani 
insists, gharadh should not be tolerated. Thus, “factional mobi-
lization for one tribe against another, or devotion to a religion 
based on exclusive belonging and enmity of other religions, 
jeopardizes truth and justice.”31
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The Bustanis’ line of argument may strike the reader as 
somewhat naïve. It certainly does not provide answers to cur-
rent problems of sectarianism. But, as Ussama Makdisi has 
argued, antisectarian dispositions emerged in their writings 
starting with Nafir Suriyya, even though there was—again—no 
name for it yet.32 If sectarianism and antisectarianism existed in 
nineteenth-century Bilad al-Sham before anyone had a word for 
it, then this has repercussions for the relationship between his-
tory and language in the Nahda and beyond. To be sure, seman-
tics alone do not constitute discourse, but discourse analysis 
without historicizing language use also impedes the meaning-
ful translation of historical texts such as Nafir Suriyya. And it is 
to the translation of this text that the second part of this book 
now turns.
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ch a p t e r 6
Clarion 1
Beirut, September 29, 18601
Countrymen,
News of the spell of atrocities and abominations committed 
this summer by the troublemakers in our midst has reached the 
corners of the Earth. All over the civilized world, it has drawn 
pity and gloom, on one hand, and anger and wrath, on the other. 
Yet, we witness charity pour in from all sides to help the needy. 
Armies from every land are also heading our way to protect the 
weak and to punish the guilty and the aggressor.
All too often we have noticed how the victorious faction 
boasts about its deeds, declaring “we have satisfied our honor” 
and the like.2 What the victors do not seem to realize is that the 
civilized world has nothing but disgust, contempt, and rage for 
what they take pride in. It regards their deeds as the work of sav-
age barbarians devoid of humanity, character, chivalry, and 
faith, the work of thieves and bandits. That is why the civilized 
world has now joined forces to unleash the worst of punishment 
on the oppressors and to teach them a lesson. At the same time, 
we see the majority of the vanquished fall under the illusion that 
the armies came only to help them seek revenge and sanction 
the looting and bloodletting of their adversaries. This is nothing 
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but a distortion of the true intentions of the Great Powers. If this 
wronged faction plans to act with this interpretation in mind, 
they would expose themselves to rage and would deserve 
harsher punishment than the victors. Sympathy for them would 
turn into harsh treatment, and as a result they would be subject 
to great harm.
Let the victors know that the time for their bravery and 
prowess has passed, and that their brandishing of arms has 
become impermissible and unacceptable. The only way forward 
then is to trust in their government and the friendly powers that 
are disembarking here to restore peacefulness and security in 
their quarters. They need to wait patiently for the philanthropic 
efforts that these states have agreed upon, for these efforts will 
duly take into account the opinions of the people and require 
their assistance.
It is a blatant mistake for the victorious faction to run away 
and leave their hometowns under the illusion that they can 
escape the punishment they deserve. Running away can only 
lead to the breakup of families and the ruin of the country. 
Moreover, it causes undue suspicion toward the innocent among 
the runaways. Neither the victorious party nor anyone else 
should assume that these states sent their representatives to take 
the side of one group over another, or to protect a certain group 
or avenge another just because they are Christian or non-Chris-
tian. As far as we know, they came only to protect the rights of 
man and to enforce the principles of justice and rule of law. No 
innocent group needs to be afraid, and we have no evidence that 
collective accusations will be levied on any one faction.
And so, countrymen, the destruction and damage that 
afflicted our land are unparalleled in historical chronicles. Most 
of you are well aware of the reasons behind this destruction. 
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This pains all the more the heart of every eyewitness and 
patriot. Even if this destruction appears to affect only some of 
you, it is, in fact, a matter affecting all. Any loss incurred comes 
out of the national treasury, and the loss of every soul is the loss 
of society as a whole.
Countrymen,
You drink the same water, you breathe the same air. The lan-
guage you speak is the same, and so are the ground you tread, 
your welfare, and your customs. You may still be intoxicated 
from drinking your compatriots’ blood, or disoriented by the 
calamities you have suffered. But very soon you must wake up 
from this stupor and realize the meaning of my advice and 
where your welfare lies. This is what I intend to convey to you 
here. I hope that I can continue writing to you, and I ask God to 
guide you toward knowing your own good and the good of your 
country. May your hearts embrace the teachings and principles 





When news of the unrest and transgressions that befell this 
country reached Sultan Aʿbd al-Majid, he was deeply moved. 
This is evident to anybody who reads the decree issued in early 
July 1860 to his excellency, the great statesman Fu aʾd Pasha, who 
was sent by the High Porte as an emissary to these lands. 
 Imperial measures to avert inequity, stop the continued distur-
bances, and achieve peace and security are further proof of his 
highness’s concern for the seriousness of the problem, his care 
for his subjects’ welfare, and his compassion for them.
Moreover, the written and spoken statements that General 
Fu aʾd Pasha expressed in this Sublime Decree upon his 
 auspicious arrival on the shores of this country have promised 
peace, security, and justice to all subjects, and have raised every-
body’s expectations that his highness will fulfill those  benevolent 
intentions and righteous promises.2
Countrymen,
You must be running out of patience because you have spent 
so much time humiliated and away from your abodes. You have 
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grown homesick and want to return to your birthplace; or, as they 
say, the country misses its people. Many of you have since lost 
your dearest friends and children and many of you are sick, bare-
foot, and needy. Your whole condition elicits sadness and grief. 
The lack of adequate retribution for the wrongdoing that you 
have suffered and the lack of compensation for the damages that 
you have incurred have undoubtedly worsened your plight and 
anxiety. As you know, to build is more difficult than to destroy, 
especially when the destruction is committed by the troublemak-
ers of a vast country and in such a short period of time. Can a 
single engineer, no matter how competent, restore its former state 
of beauty as quickly as it has been destroyed—especially if he is a 
perfectionist? This is what the current state of affairs has come to.
Countrymen,
We lament your condition. We are aware of your distress and 
your loss. They add to our pain and sadness and force us to excuse 
your obstinance and your complaints. However, we consider that the 
best approach to set things straight is not to rush things, but to delib-
erate carefully and to avoid measures that would only worsen the 
devastation. The only way going forward is to place your confidence 
and trust in those in charge and to give yourselves reason to hope 
that they will exert their efforts in supporting the oppressed and 
carrying out the justice that is due to them. The fact that the greatest 
powers of the world are lending you their attention in the desire to 
alleviate your hardship, grant you your peace, and help you obtain 
your rights should fill you with trust, confidence, and patience.
Countrymen,
Many of you say, “Whoever is patient succeeds and whoever 
is obstinate sins,” and “Patience is the key to relief,” and 
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“Obstinance is followed by regret,” and “It is prudent not to rush 
things so as not to spoil them.” Yes, blindness of the heart befell 
the Israelites because of their impatience.3 Rather than follow 
their example, would it not be better for your own sake to take 
their fate as a warning and a moral tale? How we long for your 
prompt return to your abodes so you may live in security, com-
fort, and luxury. Your way out of this is to be thankful and 
patient and ask God to bless those who saved you by preventing 
the spread of destruction, sedition, the meddling of the wicked, 
and the bloodletting. Pray to God that those in whose hands the 
affairs of the people are entrusted will guide you onto the righ-
teous path. May He support them in their initiatives to do good 
deeds and protect the rights of man.
Countrymen,
It may occasionally cross your mind that this country was 
punished by God. It’s true. Do not think otherwise, but welcome 
this idea with an open heart so that it may remind you that to 
Him you shall return. For then He shall hold back from inflict-
ing harm. Otherwise, His hand may weigh down heavily because 
God will not change the state of a people unless they change 
themselves.4
Our hope is that you read through this and the previous 
 pamphlets with a spirit of love, goodwill, and simplicity. Both 
were written with good intentions and without prejudice by 
someone who shares your feelings and is pained by your 
 calamities, which are also his. May God preserve you.
From a patriot
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What has become of your country that it is dressed in 
mourning? Why are your mountains and hilltops desolate and 
your valleys and plains looking so forlorn? Why is there ten-
sion in your towns and villages? Why are your strongmen bro-
ken, your women wailing, your virgins crying, and your 
widows and orphans in such a sorry state of deep humiliation 
and wretchedness? Why is Damascus, the jewel in the crown 
of Syria and one of the greatest and most famous of ancient cit-
ies, set amid forests and ponds under willow trees lining the 
Barada River, now draped in black, weeping for its young men 
and women, and mourning the loss of its wealth, riches, mar-
kets, and resources.
What has befallen you now? You hear voices wailing over a 
lost loved one, or a fugitive friend, or an imprisoned husband, or 
an only son in captivity, or an abducted daughter. Hither you 
hear sighs from inconsolable hearts overcome with sorrow and 
grief, broken hearts that have been filled with chalices of despair 
and depression. And thither is a deep, uninterrupted moan from 
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a heart whose troubles are mixed with incurable maladies and 
unbearable pains.
What has befallen us, now that we see over there a man hid-
ing in a cave, and another who has taken shelter in the thick 
woods among wild animals, and yet another who, like the 
brother-slayer Cain, is a fugitive who has lost his way with no 
one calling him in?
What has befallen us now that we see in this city of Beirut 
multitudes of privileged and common people alike, queuing up to 
ask for charity, when most used to be alms givers themselves?
These scenes are undoubtedly terrifying and saddening. 
How could this happen? Who are those who appeased the devil 
and inflicted this much natural and moral destruction? 
The answer to all of this can be culled from what we have 
 written previously. Time does not permit further elaboration. 
Nor is it of any use to look back at the recent past. Rather we 
must turn our attention to the future in order to alleviate 
impending calamities and to stop their negative effects and 
wicked consequences.
Countrymen,
Summer, the season of comfort and few needs, has elapsed. 
It was a season in which many of you may have been satisfied 
with just the foot of a mountain for a bed, a tree or the sky’s 
dome for a cover, and the stars as guardians. Now the trees that 
have offered you shade are starting to shed their leaves in prepa-
ration for another season. I sense menacing clouds rising from 
the west to do battle with the current climate, to block off those 
guardian stars, and to alert us to the looming winter—the sea-
son of meager means and many needs—which is charging 
toward us with its storms, snow, and bitter cold.
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Countrymen,
Ant colonies have finished stocking up for winter and have 
dug holes in the ground to protect themselves from winter’s 
harshness. Swarms of bees have brought in their harvests and 
built sturdy honeycombs stacked with their precious supply to 
settle in a hive of comfort and protection. By contrast, many of 
our brothers, sons of Adam, and our compatriots barely have 
enough means to sustain them for the day, and—even worse—
have no houses for shelter, no clothes to protect them from the 
severe cold, no furniture to accommodate them, and no storage 
for provisions. This is what makes caring for their future so very 
vital, yet so precarious.
Countrymen,
Westerners say, “Time is gold,” but for our poor brothers 
“time is life,” because every passing day costs the homeland the 
life of many of its sons. Therefore, as we pointed out before, it is 
the duty of the oppressed to be patient, as it is the religious, 
moral, and civic duty of the treacherous oppressors and those 
who are in positions of responsibility to use effective means to 
achieve the necessary security immediately and, if possible, to 
offer food, shelter, clothes, and other outstanding needs to the 
oppressed. It is also the duty of those with pride, conscience, 
and pity, whoever they might be, to exert their efforts and dedi-
cate their energy toward helping the oppressed rather than sac-
rificing them at the altar of personal pleasures, gains, interests, 
or whatever they may be.
Countrymen,
It seems that security was hatched only recently through the 
hard labor of those in charge of this country. Now it lies 
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swaddled—as per Eastern custom—in the cradle, susceptible to 
numerous and varying afflictions. Were it to be surrounded by 
strong guards and the most capable and wise physicians from 
East and West, with all their surgical tools and all sorts of medic-
inal drugs, we trust that this nascent security would be shielded 
from the vagaries of time. We also hope that their expertise 
would provide effective means for the country to grow quickly 
and reach the age of maturity in a reasonable amount of time.
Countrymen,
We like to draw your attention to the fact that it is preferable 
to live by the labor of your hands and the sweat on your forehead 
than to knock on doors and rely on charity, whose wells are nei-
ther inexhaustible nor ever lasting. We also warn you against 
the harm that unemployment does to your body, mind, and soul. 
And especially to the stricken among you, we say: rely on God, 
caretaker of the orphaned and the widowed who does not ignore 
the sighs of the wretched poor.
Countrymen,
This has been a lengthy address, but we will not conclude 
without saying the following: True religion will promote virtue 
and prevent vice. And every religion that does not have this 
characteristic does not deserve to be called religion. One of the 
virtues of Christianity, compared to other religions, is that it asks 
to love even one’s enemies. It is undoubtedly one of the most dif-
ficult commands to fulfill. However, this difficulty does not 
exempt Christians in general from striving for it at all times, in 
all places, and in all situations. While Christianity commands its 
followers to turn their right cheek to those who hit them on the 
left and to meet evil with good, it does not forbid its adherents 
Clarion 3 / 75
from demanding their rights. Rather it permits them to defend 
themselves and seek their rights, but not through the spirit of 
revenge or the love of reprisal. For there is nothing Christian 
about insisting on hate and spitefulness and  maintaining the 
spirit of revenge and reprisal. In closing, I ask God to guide you 
toward understanding this truism and to give you the strength to 





We have talked about the homeland at length in our pam-
phlets. We did so because the homeland is the dearest thing to 
those who love it, and it is the most pleasantly coined word 
adorning the Arabic language. Syria, which is known as Barr al-
Sham and Arabistan, is our homeland with all its diverse plains, 
coastlines, mountains, and barren lands. The inhabitants of 
Syria, regardless of their religious beliefs, their physical fea-
tures, their ethnicities, and their general diversity, are all our 
compatriots. For the homeland resembles a chain of many rings. 
One end of the chain represents our place of residence, birth-
place, or ancestral home. At the other end lies our country and 
everyone in it. The center and magnet of these two poles are our 
heart. The homeland holds strong sway over its children. 
It draws and holds them within its embrace, however loose this 
embrace might be. It also captures their hearts and pulls them 
closer to their homeland so that they may return even when 
their lives are more comfortable abroad.
“If homelands were not to die for, the ill-fated homelands 
would turn into ruin.” The more we identify with the home-
land’s material and moral aspects, the more we are attracted to 
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it, and the fonder we become of it.1 For we deem our house to be 
the best of houses, our compatriots the best of people. As the 
saying rightly goes: “Seek the host—not the house.” For who-
ever travels the world sees as clearly as daylight that no matter 
how meritorious a homeland is, the evils of its people can ruin it. 
Conversely, no matter how rotten it is in and of itself, the merits 
of its people compensate for it.
Countrymen,
People of the homeland have rights vis-à-vis their country 
which in turn has obligations toward them. It goes without 
saying that the more these rights are fulfilled, the more people 
grow attached to their country, and the more desirous and 
pleased they are in rendering those duties. Among the obliga-
tions that a country owes its people is to secure their 
precious right to life, honor, and prosperity.2 These 
obligations also include upholding civil, moral, and religious 
freedoms, especially the freedom of conscience in confessional 
matters. Many were the countries that were sacrificed for 
this freedom.
Compatriots love their country more whenever they sense 
that it is theirs. Their happiness lies in its civilizational develop-
ment and comfort while their misery lies in its destruction and 
misfortune. Their ability to take part in its affairs and to get 
involved in its welfare increases their desire for its success and 
their enthusiasm for its progress. The more responsibility is 
placed on them, the more intense and resolute these feelings 
become. Therefore, one of the most important duties of our 
compatriots is to love their homeland.
It has been mentioned in a hadith: “Love of the homeland is an 
element of faith.”3 Many were the people who sacrificed their 
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lives and all that they own out of love for their country. As for 
those who exchange patriotism for confessional fanaticism and 
who sacrifice the welfare of the homeland for personal interests, 
they do not deserve to belong to the homeland. They are its ene-
mies. Those who do not expend any effort to prevent or alleviate 
incidences harmful to the country are equally its enemies. In 
these difficult times, few compatriots have displayed their patri-
otism. The ugly deeds of those who fired the first shot and those 
who lifted the first stone off the mouth of the dreadful volcano 
that is torching the country and its people have forever left a 
black mark in the annals of Syria. Likewise, those who did not 
work hard to muzzle the barrel of that gun and the mouth of that 
volcano are guilty; they have fallen short in their duties toward 
their homeland.
Let us take this opportunity to make clear the feelings of 
gratitude and welcome toward our brothers who are on the 
other side of the Atlantic and toward their children who are 
guests in our country. They have shown and are still showing 
continuous assistance to our compatriots. Their generosity 
shames us.
Countrymen,
Our country is world renowned for its water, air, and soil. It is 
the most proud and praiseworthy. Yet for a number of genera-
tions, it has been afflicted by the corruption of uncivilized seg-
ments of its people. That is why you see it increasingly lagging 
behind other countries and becoming even more backward fol-
lowing the recent unrest. But we hope that with the help of God, 
with the stamina of our Sublime State and the friendly Great 
Powers, this current setback, whose echoes have reached the 
corners of the inhabited Earth, will turn into the beginning of 
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great goodness and usher in a new age for Syria. The following 
may suffice as a reminder for those who are weary:
Tell those who carry a burden: burdens do not last
Happiness dies out; worries become a thing of the past
Countrymen,
We warn you of obstinacy, despotism, fanaticism, and idle-
ness. They are devoid of goodness. And we alert you to these 
precious words: “Do unto others as you would have them do 
unto you.” We remind you of this as well: Man’s true homeland 
is not in this world but in the spiritual world beyond the grave. 
There he shall remain till the horn is sounded and he is resur-
rected for Judgment. Alas, many of our brethren have gone this 
year to this other, everlasting homeland. Numerous are the 
causes but death is one. It is therefore incumbent that we  prepare 





The worst thing under the firmament is war, and the most hor-
rendous among them are civil wars, which break out between the 
commoners of a single country and which are often triggered by 
trivial causes and for ignoble aims. Civil wars are not only the 
negation of justice and a transgression against the rights of those 
in command. They show no respect for the most generous feel-
ings and most noble rights of man. These include national frater-
nity, harmony, gratitude, and kindness toward neighbours and 
those compatriots who possess chivalry and humanity. The war 
that erupted this year was one of the most horrendous civil wars. 
Its flames have wrought enormous damage onto our religious, 
moral, and civil interests and public welfare. As a result, the 
country and the world have lost so much and at great costs 
and risks.
Countrymen,
How can we excuse the sons of our homeland in the eyes of 
foreigners? How else but to point to their stupidity, their lack of 
civility, and the triumph of their carnal appetites over their 
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rational faculties? Perhaps the magnanimous will excuse them, 
given the extraordinary circumstances they acted under. 
For what does one expect from a land whose inhabitants are 
bands of many tribes divided by character traits, moods, 
 prejudice, and self-interest, a land where few care about public 
welfare and many do not feel this country is theirs.1
Syria lies between two countries, Egypt and the Ottoman 
empire, which have often pulled it in different directions. 
Within a single generation, it has tilted at times to one 
side and at other times to the other.2 In both instances, Syria 
has  unfortunately found itself in the peripheries of each 
empire. It was far removed from the center of government, 
that is to say, from the capital of both empires. Its tutelage 
was thus left to the mercy of the same people who were 
responsible for Syria’s demise, as history and our forefathers 
have taught us.
Syria is also the birthplace and stage of many conflicting civil 
and religious prejudices whose organization and origins are at 
odds with each other. We know of no other country whose fate 
has endured such tribulations as Syria and yet remained 
 inhabited and home to a people that, despite all, have kept their 
morals, honor, chivalry, and enthusiasm. These characteristics 
give us hope for Syria’s advancement and civilization, as long as 
the people who uphold them are supported by a modern system 
of governance that works both for the welfare of the country and 
for the comfort of its subjects. Is it possible then for someone 
who considers what we said without bias and prejudice not to 
excuse these people, given what he sees of mutual schisms, 
estrangement, and shortcomings? Is it possible not to protest 
against all the delusions and difficulties he sees in their politics 
and the way they run things?
82 / Chapter 10
Countrymen,
When we inspect this land’s historical record to search for 
lessons of what the future might hold, we regret to say that this 
history is full of wars and catastrophes. We also find that your 
prejudice has, like an ugly black spot, shamelessly replaced 
patriotism at the center of each page of our history. Even in the 
best of times, when the land was basking in ease, prosperity, fer-
tility, and peace, this wicked carnal principle has often raised its 
head and frothed wildly. Inherited from barbarians, prejudice 
left behind destruction and peril and squandered the land’s 
wealth and its families.
During the days of Cairo’s rule over Syria, a group of patriots 
assembled to contain this form of partisanship and tried to 
weaken or destroy it.3 But shortly afterward, the shrewd work-
ings of time and the events of those days let partisanship escape 
again. As it rose up with great might, its wicked effects began to 
take hold. It is too bad they did not put a millstone around its 
neck and throw it into the bottomless depths of the sea!
This wicked concept takes different colors at every stage. 
It once took the form of notable rivalries such as the one between 
the Qaysi and Yamani factions, and then between the Jumblats 
and the Yazbakis.4 One of its ugliest forms has appeared in these 
last few years. It took on names sacred to its people—names like 
Christian and Druze, and then Muslim and Christian. 
These sacred names had long been buried under the previous 
ones of the Qaysi/Yamani and Jumblat/Yazbak splits, but the 
concept has appropriated these sacred and old names, realizing 
the magical and formidable force that they hold when used in the 
context of what the people of our country call “the source of 
attachment”—that is, kinship.5 As such, this wicked concept 
served the machinations of the most powerful leaders of 
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prejudices with the result that its power multiplied and its effects 
became far-reaching.
On a pitch-dark night, we observed from this city a series of 
terrifying blazes ascending from the Matn. It was as if we saw the 
fire of partisanship go up along with the burning houses.6 Should 
partisanship die out as we had envisioned, you shall rejoice in 
prosperity, comfort, and security. We send you our condolences 
and ask that you do not regret its demise despite the frequently 
invoked saying “He who has no partisanship has no religion.” 
For such a saying has been passed down generations from bar-
baric peoples whose religion is founded on prejudice. But what is 
the benefit of a religion if it is based on prejudice?
Countrymen,
We have often heard you say that this was the third bout of 
ruinous events in the span of less than twenty years. Now that you 
have tried civil wars time and again and have weighed its gains 
and losses, we ask you: What have you won? Have any of you 
become a king, a marshal, or a minister? Have you attained a 
higher rank and status, or increased your wealth or fame? What 
have you achieved other than the bereavement of widows and 
orphaned children, moral depravation, poverty, and destruc-
tion—in both this life and the hereafter—as well as humiliation 
and belittlement in the eyes of wise men and  foreigners? What has 
come about other than decimating the number of able hands upon 
whose hard work the reconstruction of the country and the com-
fort of its people depend? What has come about other than depriv-
ing the country of its richest,  wisest, smartest, and most able men?
Now, is it not better for your own sake to replace blind preju-
dices—which is merely a euphemism for excessive self-love—
with patriotism, affection, concord, and unity, all of which are 
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prerequisites for the country’s success? Is it not in your interest to 
shun the cursed devil, extend the carpet of hospitality, remember 
the harmony of olden times, and roll up your sleeves for the sake 
of alleviating these catastrophes and making up for this destruc-
tion? Are you not aware that you are your brother’s keeper, not 
his enemy? Should not this be the voice of the wise among you 
and the opinion of those who have your best interest at heart and 
do not wish to leave your affairs to chance? If so, then the guilty 
among you should gladly and voluntarily pay their dues. 
And those who have been victims of injustice should pursue their 
rights kindly and patiently under the aegis of those in charge, for 
their authority is bestowed by God, and they did not carry the 
sword in vain. Countrymen, this is for your own benefit.
Countrymen,
It had occurred to us frequently—before the recent events—
to sound this clarion in order to alert you to the vicious effects of 
civil wars. But having observed the condition of the people and 
that they were bent on playing out the scenario in their head, we 
and other wise people figured that the sweet sound of the patri-
ot’s clarion would have been drowned out by the crude drum-
beat of prejudices and ill intent. So we held our breath.
Now that we have seen with our own eyes the burning fire of 
partisanship, we decided to speak out where regrettably we have 
been silent before. We consider this belated call a modest service 
to our homeland in the hope that it will be well received despite 
its shortcomings. Our duty is to write and to remind you. Your 
duty is to read and reflect. And what ultimately comes to pass is 
in the hands of God, the facilitator. May He preserve you.
From a patriot
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Losses and Gains of the Homeland
Countrymen,
The homeland’s losses and damages due to the recent unrest 
have been so costly that it is difficult to imagine their extent.1 
The precise calculation of such losses requires the skills of a tal-
ented accountant. They are divided into material losses, which 
is our focus now, and moral ones, which—God willing—we 
will elaborate on later. Material losses include the country’s 
houses, seasonal staples, revenues, harvests, belongings, cattle 
and the like that have been damaged by fire, destruction, van-
dalism, and theft. Losses also include what has been siphoned 
out of the country through bribery, treachery, and extortion, or 
by other means. As for what remains in the hands of local usurp-
ers, they do not count as losses since they simply changed hands 
within our homeland.
If we add the value of the approximately thirty thousand 
burnt-down houses to the value of the buildings and harvests 
that have been destroyed all over the country, the total will 
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amount to 367 million piasters (around 367 million francs), which 
comes close to three and a half times the value of Syria’s annual 
revenue of silk (estimated at two thousand qantars per year). 
This is an approximate balance sheet put together from reliable 
sources. We would rather not go over it in any detail lest we 
leave the door open to arguments and objections. The actual 
value of the damages is likely to be even higher than our esti-
mates because, except in rare cases, the value of possessions in 
the eyes of their owners is always higher than the real value or 
the one decided by an impartial outsider. Moreover, some peo-
ple who fear that their claims will be devalued or slightly 
reduced may exaggerate their estimated losses so that final com-
pensation is at least close to what they honestly thought they 
deserved. This means that those who provide honest estimates 
clearly risk incurring losses.
If only everyone were to agree to present accurate estimates, 
even if they incur a loss! For loss—no matter how great it is—is 
preferable, more acceptable, and more honorable when borne 
with honesty than any dishonorable gain regardless how exorbi-
tant it is. If only there was among us a rational and intelligent 
person who can propose a solution to this problem while balanc-
ing between conscience and coffer. Whatever solution he may 
present will not work unless there is mutual trust between the 
people and the government, and unless the perpetrators pay for 
these extensive damages according to the law, customs, religion, 
and the political process.
Countrymen,
No matter how vast and devastating the aforementioned 
losses were, eventually the might of kings or the hard work of 
ordinary people can, with God’s blessing, compensate all or 
some of them. But there are losses, not even a tiny fraction of 
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which all the kings of the Earth together could compensate, 
even if they mustered all their men and money, expertise and 
will power. For who could return a father to an orphan, a hus-
band to a widow, an only son to an impotent elder, or a dear 
daughter to a bereaved old woman? God alone is the father of 
the orphan, lord of the widow, the aid of the impotent, the 
crutch of the despairing. He alone has the power to cool the pas-
sions of the heart of these poor ones, give solace, mend the 
 broken hearts, and balm their incurable, open wounds.
You realize that losses of this kind are not minor. It is 
 estimated that twenty thousand people died in the unrest. These 
include those who were ravaged by the blade of the sword, and 
those who were killed by accident or in revenge, and those who 
died from fear and anxiety, and from dreadful living conditions 
and sheer fatigue. They also include martyred children who 
were sacrificed at the altar of savage barbarity. We had seen in 
them the next generation who should surpass us with their civil-
ity, knowledge, and culture. At every sunset the numbers of the 
dead increase and at every sunrise many more are transferred 
from the books of the living to the registers of the dead. If we 
were to pay reparations for them, they would reach at least six 
hundred million piasters. But it is far from us to attach a price to 
the creatures of God who are more precious than the entire 
material world.
If only the destruction and losses of this catastrophe would 
end so that we stop counting more numbers. The prospects for 
the future are obscure. Yes, very bleak and unknown to us. How 
much we wish that new paths be opened for us so that we can 
plead for better turns! So far we do not know when the time will 
come for the sun of hope and comfort to rise over Syria and 
never to set again. We ask God to look with kindness and mercy 
on this ill-fated country.
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Countrymen,
One of the material losses was that so much of the land lay 
fallow this year because of the lack of cattle and seeds. This has 
multiplied the tribulations and pushed many of the people into 
beggary. But who guarantees us that the gates of charity will 
remain open and will not be blocked by an iron bolt and brass 
lock before the end of the impending winter? What is the state 
of this impoverished multitude that has been thrown onto the 
shoulders of the giving by the ordeals of the age?
Fifty thousand active men have been rendered unemployed. 
Work has now been suspended for six months, and we do not 
know when this state of affairs will end. Shops are closed, liveli-
hood and manufacture suspended. What pen can calculate such 
losses? The Syria we knew six months ago, with its distinguished 
character among the Ottoman empire’s lands, its opulence, com-
fort, and wonderful progress in the field of architecture, has 
fallen. In a way it was different from the rest of the empire. Yes, 
it has fallen indeed! And it is unlikely to recover from this dev-
astating demise for many years to come, save by miracle or some 
extraordinary feat.
Whoever inspects the financial books of the imperial powers 
will notice that vast funds have been allocated to solving the 
Syrian Question, and will see that the account has not been 
closed yet. New accounts of material losses inflicted on Syria 
continue to be registered. It is thus fair to judge that all that it 
possesses is not enough to settle the account even if it sold itself, 
unless it is agreed that the debt be paid by what the Ottoman 
Treasury owes Syria. Only then may Syria rise above this crip-
pling debt while remaining, as long as it exists, morally beholden 
to the countries that aided it.
The tally of debts owed to foreign states based on the losses 
to foreign residents due to looting of their properties, damages, 
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waste of time, closure of their shops, and so on is enormous. 
Obviously, Syria cannot even hope to pay back all these foreign 
claims from its own treasury.
Countrymen,
We should not conclude this discussion without mentioning 
some of Syria’s elusive gains. One of them is national charity. 
Since this remained within the country, it counts toward both 
liabilities and assets and as such does not feature in the account-
ing books. Although these donations hold enormous value, most 
of them were allotted in silence. Taken each separately, they are 
barely discernable, even through a magnifying glass. Most ordi-
nary people who made donations to alleviate this calamity have 
given more than they can afford while many of the wealthy have 
yet to participate in this blessed act of charity. The latter collect 
money and do not know for whom they collect; what they have 
kept from the mouths of the needy despite all their wealth they 
will end up paying all at once to those who may not even return 
the favor with merciful prayers.
As for state aid, it amounts to around fifty thousand purses.2 
If these purses are to be considered a loan, charity, or goodwill 
gesture on behalf of the perpetrators, then, for obvious reasons, 
we need to list them under both liabilities and assets in the 
country’s accounts. In all civilized countries, the wealth and 
poverty of the government treasury are equated with the wealth 
of its subjects and vice versa. As for American and European 
charitable donations, they, too, are estimated at around fifty 
thousand purses. We have to offer unconditional gratitude 
because without them many would have died out of hunger and 
miserable living conditions. Since the value of such generosity is 
always double that of the donation, what is owed must be listed 
as twice what was donated. Our hope is that the people of our 
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country do not turn away from the noble motto “Blessed are 
those who give more than they take.” May they strive to be the 
spring of largesse as they have been its recipients.
Some are under the illusion, or wish to pretend they are, that 
these charitable acts are due to the magnanimity of kings or the 
generosity of states. In fact, they are the sacrifices and offerings 
of subjects as ordinary as those receiving them. They are the 
fruits of the hard work of widows and orphans. They come from 
the altruism of small children and the sweat on the foreheads of 
workers and professionals. The heart of aid recipients who care 
to examine this truth will surely bleed when they make use of 
the assistance. One expects them not to take lightly donations 
borne out of morsels of food earned with pain and money earned 
through hard, tiresome work.
Given this reality, a clear conscience is required that monitors 
the distribution and acceptance of these charities in order to make 
sure that they are received with gratitude and honesty. As for the 
claim that the Syrian unrest is the start of a worldwide war caus-
ing total destruction, we believe it is baseless. Our limited insight 
tells us that the desired goal of bringing peace and prosperity back 
to Syria can be achieved through extensive means. Otherwise, we 
are left to conclude that the world has gone old and mad or to 
agree with some of the astrologers who, guided by their visions 
and observations, have ordained that the Day of Judgment has 
arrived at our gates. If this were really the case, we would not 
need to feel sorry that it is too late or too early; we would need to 
worry about neither past nor future losses and destructions.
Countrymen,
This unrest has certainly affected your feelings deeply. But if 
it has turned your hearts into stone, encouraged you to sin and 
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be disobedient or to ignore religious, moral, and civic duties, 
then rest assured that the aforementioned losses were grossly 
underestimated. God’s hand will strike harder and spiritual dev-
astation will be added to the temporal one.
If this unrest led you to repent to God, steer away from sins, 
hatred, and enmities, mend your errant ways, and uphold reli-
gious scriptures and principles, then we overestimated our loss. 
In that case, the homeland would gain tremendously. 
Though caused by the evil of sin and corruption of the hearts, 
this blow could, in fact, become an epiphany for you, your 
 children, and your country to seek self-improvement. As the 
Lord said: “if you obey me and keep to my commandments, you 
will reap the fruits of the Earth, and if you don’t obey me you 
will be struck down by the blade of the sword.”
Countrymen,
Heed what hath been said. Do not say that now is not the 
time to be religious, that it is all falling on deaf ears, that it is like 
flogging a dead horse. These and other clichés like them are just 
obsessions perpetuated by the enemies of our common good 
who roar like lions ready to devour us. Those who are fore-
warned must listen and those who are the spiritual guides must 
pay attention; the well-being of the soul ought not be sacrificed 
on the altar of the comfort of the body. For this is the right time, 
and this is the time for salvation.
Awake! Awake! Oh Shepherds of Israel and leaders of the peo-
ple, why are you asleep and feigning ignorance? Behold the 
ferocious lions who come to devour flock and shepherd alike.3
From a patriot
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Moral Losses of the Homeland
Countrymen,
The moral losses that befell the homeland as a result of the 
recent unrest are many and varied. They are even more crimi-
nal and evil than the material losses mentioned in the previous 
address. Among the moral losses is the loss of the concord that 
our fathers and grandfathers bequeathed us. This loss is tremen-
dous in itself but, as the astute critic knows, the national concord 
was already shaky before the eruption of the recent civil war. 
Indeed, the current losses of the homeland only increased the 
estrangement and antagonism between different communities 
and among members of the same community.2
Those who observed carefully the country’s state of affairs 
before the current crisis and noticed how the hearts were filled 
with malice and hatred predicted that these thick dark clouds 
were going to result in muddied and sullied living conditions. 
They also expected that the filth of hatred and extreme preju-
dice that was stored up in people’s chests for many years would 
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at some point in time erupt in a violent outburst. The slightest 
trigger would lead to the destruction of everything and every-
one in its wake because the deep wound inflicted by the treach-
ery of earlier wars and unrests was sealed before it was cleansed 
from pernicious infections.
Hearts suppressed their hatred and anger while waiting for an 
opportune moment to shoot their sharp arrows at those standing 
in the way of these hearts’ ascendant power and prestige. 
These wicked wars have in turn placed a father’s killer in front of 
his son, turned the killer of a son into his father’s neighbor, 
placed a thief of a robbed mother in front of her daughter, and 
positioned the defamer of a daughter next to her mother. 
Zayd’s cap was placed on ʿUbayd’s head and Hind’s necklace on 
Daʿ ad’s neck.3 Memories of such injustices came to be stirred, at 
opportune moments, in order to arouse the malicious feelings 
that were—under the effect of songs and lullabies—dormant but 
not asleep. What is expected from a people and from neighbors 
in such miserable states when they have no religious, moral, or 
civil wisdom to restrain them? Rather, enmity, social divisions, 
and family factions were constantly mobilized for purposes we 
are neither too blind to see nor too foolish to see through.
Countrymen,
It is no secret how dangerous it is for a country or district to 
fail to punish murderers or to grant free rein to people who have 
become used to looting and shedding blood. Such men who have 
inherited these traits from their fathers and forefathers by nature 
and nurture have often experienced the pleasures of  impunity—
even rewards—associated with their deeds.
Is it possible for a country and a people that are in such a 
wretched state as we are to sustain peace, concord, and calm for 
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any length of time? The reality of the current situation proves 
that the honest answer is clearly “no”—that it seems absolutely 
impossible. If we remain silent, the rocks of Syria will speak out 
loud, as will the blood of its people. We should not resign our-
selves to the claims that the peoples’ feelings are noble and 
strong enough to weather the sword and the bullets. For while 
those who are free from such violent aspirations exhibit some of 
the most pleasant and delicate traits, we see that the people with 
prejudice are still active and mobilized.
We hope that, this time around, matters do not fall under the 
old rule of “let bygones be bygones.” This was about to happen 
again were it not for the arrival of the great statesman, His 
Excellency Fu aʾd Pasha. May the remedies be stronger and may 
the sanctions be more effective this time. Despite the constant 
delays we are witnessing, this hope is not without grounds. As 
the poet’s saying goes:
A people stand to lose from vacillation
When decisiveness would have solved the situation
Countrymen,
The homeland needs concord for its survival, construction, 
and prosperity. We know from experience that the loss of 
 concord is one of the most painful and pernicious losses. 
But someone may wonder: “Is the return to concord possible 
after what happened?” For as the poet says:
Hearts are like bottles of glass
When broken cannot be recast
It is clear that this verse contains as much exaggeration as 
wisdom. Perhaps it was uttered by a pre-Islamic poet who did 
not live long enough to see it refuted by history or, occasionally, 
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by general experience. For concord, unlike discord, is a natural 
instinct of mankind that denotes companionship—as opposed 
to estrangement—and not forgetfulness, as some claim. 
Concord was indispensable for the rise of mankind and the 
 promotion of the interests and well-being of human existence. 
This is why our hopes for a return to concord are high, in the 
long run at least. And we thought it befitting to alter the previ-
ous verse to read:
Glass bottles are broken forever
But estranged hearts can be mended together
One should not understand our words to mean that we advocate 
a return to concord with blood shedders. No one who values the 
good of the public and the country over the good of the individ-
ual or groups of individuals would call for such a thing. And it is 
no secret that the return of concord and its very existence, per-
sistence, and growth depend on certain conditions, most 
urgently on the following.
First: We need living and attentive religions to teach their 
children to view those who hold different beliefs neither with 
contempt nor with scorn, as is now often the case, but with care 
and affection, as among members of one family whose father is 
the homeland, its mother the Earth, and God the single creator, 
with all members created out of the same substance, sharing the 
same destiny. God does not favor one individual over another for 
their title or group association, but for their knowledge, piety, 
reason, virtue, neighborliness, and upholding of the rights of 
mankind and the common good. Human beings are valued by 
two attributes: what they feel and what they say. For us, laws are 
to be obeyed, the rights they bestow upheld, and the duties they 
entail fulfilled. Anyone who studies the histories of religious 
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communities and peoples knows the harm visited upon religion 
and people when religious and civil matters, despite the vast 
difference between them, are mixed. This mixing should not be 
allowed on religious or political grounds. But how often has it 
had a hand in the present destruction? God knows, and so do 
you. And since this patriot is not from the band of fools, he 
also knows.
Second: We need wakeful and firm local authorities capable 
of drawing the line against transgressors without exposing 
their inability to draw on support from outside their area of 
jurisdiction. They will treat all classes equally and provide 
law-abiding people with full religious, moral, and civil rights. 
These rights are not privileges dependent on affiliation to a 
person or to a group of people, but they are rights as such.
Third: We need agreed-upon legislation, just provisions and 
legal prosecution based on evidence rather than personal favor-
itism. These need to be in harmony with the times and indepen-
dent from religious laws.
Fourth: We need to reject blind partisanship so that a family 
or a group cannot be condemned because of the actions of one of 
its members. Likewise, the homeland as a whole cannot be con-
demned because of the guilt of some of its sons; nor can we 
neglect the many charitable deeds of its helpful and humane 
sons. To maintain concord effectively we advise you to avoid 
this natural inclination to condemn an entire race and to attack 
it because of the failings of some of its members. In fact, it 
appears that, more than in other successful countries, the wel-
fare and construction in this country, where divisions are so rife, 
depend heavily on these concerns; and their absence is one of 
the most important reasons for the destruction and the retarda-
tion that have befallen these lands.
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Countrymen,
We are pleased to see how many of you are now returning 
home, and that some of you have begun to rebuild your houses. 
What makes us happier still is the hope that this time you do not 
build for destruction and do not gather fuel to rekindle the war, 
which, in the past, has only helped the barbarians lay their hands 
on the abodes of innocent families. Without such hope we would 
have suggested that you build in brick and wood rather than stone.
We know that the good progress of your affairs depends on 
intermixing and assimilation, which results in concord and unity. 
In spite of all objections and contradictions, we hope that some-
thing of this concord will sprout and grow after the  abundant 
rains that are expected early this year. May this rain bring us a 
season of fertility and help us forget some of the past despair.
We bring good news to the afflicted among you. Humanity’s 
gifts of compassion and sacrifice continue to be offered aplenty 
via steamships from all corners of the world. God has done to 
the homeland what a father does to his child. The father, who 
loves his child and does not seek vengeance, beats the child with 
one hand to discipline it and uses persuasion with the other to 
educate it. Similarly, after striking down this country with a 
heavy hand, God invoked pity toward it in the hearts of do-
gooders. His deeds have rendered this city and its compassion-
ate residents a haven for the hard-pressed and a refuge for the 
miserable. He has linked the old world with the new through 
issuing and receiving aid. Through His superb providence and 
high qualities He has warned people so they may turn away 




Beirut, December 14, 18601
More on the Moral Losses of the Homeland
Countrymen,
One of the moral losses that the homeland has suffered is a 
loss of what we call integrity or self-respect. Many a time we 
saw some patriot lowering his gaze—especially these days when 
foreigners mention this topic—not out of cowardice or fear, but 
out of embarrassment and shame. How often he would apologize 
for his fellow countrymen’s state of affairs, arguing that it is how 
most people behave in catastrophes. And yet, the denigrator 
would retort: “This behavior is a natural product of Arab instinct 
regardless of current circumstances.” Perhaps you are of the 
opinion that such a claim is hard to refute by someone seeking 
the truth rather than sophistry. But one cannot pass a moral 
judgment based on anecdotes. Perhaps, once they review our 
specific circumstances and understand how humiliated we have 
been generation after generation, those who denigrate us will 
consider our situation with more integrity and empathy. Had 
they found themselves in a similarly humiliating situation, they 
would hardly have marveled at their downfall into a situation as 
low and demeaning as ours.
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May fellow countrymen take note and in the future behave in 
a way that would pull them out of their ignoble situation and 
restore their self-respect. This will earn them respect in the 
eyes of others and gradually erase the traits they have acquired 
under the influence of recent events. One of these acquired 
traits is the inability to say what one believes and believe what 
one hears. A foreigner who reads this might exclaim: “Strange, 
what does the patriot mean? Before the current unrest, were his 
compatriots any more truthful to claim the events made them 
less so? And who would believe the words of an Arab—whether 
rich, well placed, or of noble origin?” This quip is as obvious as 
a fire on a hilltop. So how and with what do we argue against 
people questioning our entire race, even as we observe a corre-
lation between their words and reality, especially if we take the 
race as a whole?
Perhaps our fellow countrymen are displeased to see us 
repeat the same allegations we are trying to refute. Once, when 
I was speaking to a man who thinks little of the Arab race and 
who dismisses all Arabs as cheating liars without exception or 
consideration of conscience, the Arab blood in me started to 
boil. In response to his sharp comments, I exclaimed heatedly 
that lying and cheating are natural dispositions in all peoples 
and races, a truism backed by what the Messenger has said: “All 
people are liars.”
I did not leave it at that but added: “If Arabs lie more fre-
quently in number and in quantity compared to other races, it is 
because they lie spontaneously, without deliberation or pru-
dence, nor with a motive or gain in mind, as is the case with the 
rest of the things they do.” But the lying of other races may be 
graver than that of the Arabs in terms of gravity and quality. For 
other races lie deliberately and prudently for their own benefit. 
It is as if their lies are as masterly executed as their deeds.
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It is known that two things hold people from lying: religion 
and public opinion. If only both were present. As for Arab reli-
gions, we do not want to touch this delicate matter for fear of 
offending the feelings of those who uphold it dearly. It will suf-
fice to ask each person to examine their own religion very 
closely and see whether it gives them an absolute license to lie, 
or whether it forbids lying completely, or whether it allows it in 
certain situations but under special conditions and constraints. 
We are certain that any religion that allows lying cannot be 
valid. That is because a true religion is from God, who is the 
truth and its source, as opposed to lying, which is the work of 
Lucifer, who is the father of lying and liars. Bear in mind that 
what some call frivolous, symbolic, or fraudulent lying—what 
Westerners refer to as “white lies”—is as real and sinister as 
lying can be. It can even be the fount and precursor to serious 
deceit, for he who is indifferent to venial sins slowly slips into 
mortal sins.
As for Arab public opinion, no one can claim that it is opposed 
to this malicious vice of lying. As our popular street saying goes: 
“Lies are the salt of men, so shame on the gullible.” This saying 
seems to represent public sentiment in this regard and may be 
used as proof for what we are arguing. However, in the eyes of the 
truthful—including nonbelievers—the status of the liar is dimin-
ished, whosoever that liar is. As is the case in countries where 
honesty is highly regarded, those characterized by this vile trait 
do not deserve to be part of respectable society. They are ostra-
cized because they lack self-respect and a sense of honor.
Now, most of you who are reading this pamphlet will admit 
that the language of Arabs and their culture—their laws, habits, 
or social structures, their political relations—may contain more 
things that foster lying or disrespect for truthfulness than those 
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among non-Arabs. Obviously, sparse honesty increases the pro-
pensity to disbelieve, and the words of liars are doubted, even 
when they speak the truth. It is related that once a shepherd was 
herding the sheep of his father near his hometown when he 
cried jokingly, “Wolf! Wolf!” People hurried to help him but did 
not find a wolf. He did that twice and thrice and the people kept 
coming for help. But then an actual wolf came by and when the 
boy called for help, no one rushed to his aid. The wolf devoured 
him and drove away his sheep.
Truth telling and credulity were scarce before the current 
unrest in this country and became even more so after it—so 
much so that one could be forgiven for thinking that we are liv-
ing in a world of make believe, not reality. And since truth tell-
ing and credulity are two essential pillars of comfort, security, 
and success in business and social conduct, their absence consti-
tutes a grave evil and a great loss.
Let’s hope that our people will change the previous saying 
into “Truth is the salt of men, and shame on the liars!” and stick 
to the new rendition in word and deed. Otherwise, this patriot 
himself will be obliged to cite what the Cretan poet and prophet 
once said to his compatriots, as recorded in the Epistle to Titus, 
namely that vice, like disease, is pervasive among all peoples 
and races, and so each distinguished itself by a particular bad 
trait for which each became known.2
Who has traits that are all agreeable?
He is noble whose faults are enumerable
Another moral loss was that of general comfort all over the 
country. Whoever roams Syrian cities, villages, mountains, and 
plains these days—especially those places that were the theater 
of war and transgressions—will only come across extremely 
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depressing scenes, and will only hear whining, complaints, and 
dissatisfaction with the misery all around. Even more ruin 
seems to lie ahead in a different garb. It is possible that one of 
the results of this unrest is the flight of so much money and so 
many men that the inhabitants left in the country are in such a 
state of humiliation and want that many of them will turn into 
impoverished beggars.
True, we see that a house is being built over here, and a plot 
of land is being ploughed over there, but we fear that every time 
a private dome is built, a public shrine is torn down. It was said 
that one day a cat entered a blacksmith’s shop, and licked the 
rasp. It tasted so sweet that the cat kept on licking until he 
became tongue-less. How miserable and unfortunate Syria is! 
How few are its means! And how neglectful its people have been! 
Would Syria not be better off and able to avoid this miserable 
state if it could get rid of the murderers that constitute the germs 
of corruption? It is as if this country is doomed with misfortune 
and backwardness or—as the saying goes—“Under a curse and 
abetting its own ruin.” It is as if whenever Syria takes one step 
forward it takes several steps backward. Who can fend off fate 
and destiny?
Another loss was that of trust between one community and 
another and among members of the same community. Such a 
loss strips people of their peace of mind and sense of prosperity. 
It also stands in the way of their progress and success. One abys-
mal type of this lack of trust—which has very damaging conse-
quences—is the lack of confidence in the rulers and the ruled or 
between the subjects and their government. It is widely known 
that the state officials’ trust in ordinary people is largely condi-
tional on the people’s trust in them and vice versa. Therefore 
hard work is required from both sides to regain trust and 
strengthen its foundations.3
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Let us hope that the heinous effects brought about by the 
recent events will gradually be alleviated through the corrective 
actions of ruler and ruled. Rulers need to exercise wisdom, gov-
ern with aptitude, and reform their conduct toward their sub-
jects, whom they should respect. Subjects, on the other hand, 
need to know that their best interest lies in the common good, to 
exercise forbearance and avoid extremism in seeking a pardon 
or punishment for what is prohibited politically, religiously, 
morally, and according to custom. Then, the wheel of trust will 
eventually spin back to its previous level, based on ties, customs, 
upbringing, and traits as well as on the common degree of civi-
lization shared between both ruler and ruled.
Another moral loss is that of some people’s family honor. Per-
petrators of such irreparable loss have surpassed the limits of 
humanity and gone even further than the savages and barbar-
ians who refrain from heinous acts that are disgusting to the ear 
and revolting to human nature. Yet another loss is that of many 
rare books and valuable libraries. In the past, books were saved 
from the damage of mites, dust, and fire by selling them off 
cheaply and thus dispensing them to the people. This time 
around, the hand of cruelty has not exempted books. Nor did 
the hand of cruelty exempt the herds of animals, not even the 
silkworm, whose hard labor helps weave clothing to provide for 
the naked and shield orphans and widows. Finally, we have lost 
the safety of doing business. Many craftsmen and their practical 
skills are irreplaceably lost. Who can calculate all this damage 
to the homeland as well as to the government?
And what about spiritual losses and the corruption of the 
manners and morals of the public? All of these are hard to miss 
by the perceptive observers among us. There are other losses 
that we chose not to mention for brevity’s sake or due to their 
infamy. What we have mentioned in this and the previous two 
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addresses will persuade those who want to believe that wars 
generate enormous evil and that civil wars are the most evil 
thing under the sun.
Does it befit us to stand by and look on at these losses with 
our hands tied only to find ourselves in a state of despair and 
hopelessness, unable to compensate the loss? Nay, our way for-
ward is to roll up our sleeves, to make a determined effort to 
conduct our affairs calmly and quietly, and to acquire what 
grants us peace and success. We need to alleviate the damage 
and destruction around and within us, while avoiding its causes 
through self-reflection. The rest is best left to Heavenly 
 Prudence and Self-Sufficient Providence, and to the efforts, 
 acumen, and wisdom of those in charge.
These are the material and moral losses we set out to show. 
God willing, we will follow this with an inventory of moral 
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Moral Gains of the Homeland
Countrymen,
A reader of the title of this pamphlet might stop and wonder: 
Given this patriot’s previous criticism and given the size of the 
damage and loss incurred by it, are there any benefits at all that 
the homeland has gained from the civil unrest?
Since in our corrupt world good and evil do not exist in their 
pure forms and since every matter has two sides—one dark and 
ugly, the other bright and pleasant—the Syrian affair, too, does 
have its bright side. So far, we have not exposed our publication’s 
readers to this side except on rare occasions, in passing, or in 
digressions. Now, we do not want to be accused of being cock-
eyed and, like perennial pessimists, of talking only about the 
dark side of the current affair. Rather, we would like to raise our 
compatriots’ hopes and alleviate some of the depressing effects 
that the ugly scenes of past events brought about. So we decided 
to elaborate on what kind of positive side effects the unrest may 
have generated for the homeland. Potential past and future gains 
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occur as by-products of events rather than as intended  outcomes; 
or—to put it better—they are the workings of Providence. 
So this is what we say.
One of the moral gains of the latest unrest is our compatriots’ 
concrete realization of the horrors of civil war in their own right 
as well as in the results they yield. This knowledge should, of 
course, make them feel deep remorse and genuine regret for what 
has happened; it should also serve as a deterrent for committing 
such repulsive acts in the future. Knowledge through personal 
experience will reinforce these sentiments and expose how sense-
less such violence is. As the saying goes: “They learn through 
their pockets.” Sooner or later, the issues that have triggered the 
strife and led people to act the way they did are bound to be put 
before an official commission and tried for all their implications 
and consequences. Based on this, people do well to realize that it 
is better for them to settle conflicts by these permissible, nay 
politically and religiously sanctioned, means. Allowing disagree-
ments to go beyond the limits of moderation by seeking revenge 
will only unleash on them more evil destruction, the wrath of the 
authorities, and the contempt of the civilized world.
Another gain is that fellow countrymen may now realize that 
their public welfare and by extension their personal well-being 
require that virtuous ties of unity and concord exist between 
the different communities and among themselves individually. 
No wise man can deny that the people of Syria possess the high-
est quality of mind, natural alertness, and the preparedness for 
moral and industrial progress toward the highest degrees of civ-
ilization. Let those with nefarious intentions and those who are 
prejudiced against the Syrians say what they may. Syria remains 
one of the finest countries in terms of its natural strength and 
commercial centers. The country and its people would not 
have reached this state of deterioration, humiliation, and 
Clarion 9 / 107
backwardness were it not for the lack of unity and paucity of 
love among Syrians, for their indifference to the welfare of their 
country and compatriots, for their incredibly foolish surrender 
to the power of fanaticism, and for the allure of confessional, 
sectarian, and familial prejudices. Add to that their willingness 
to be led by the conspiracies and machinations of those who do 
not care about the welfare of current or future generations. Such 
people relish the proliferation of differences and enmities among 
factions and between individuals. In fact, they hold full sway 
over the hearts of allies and victims alike and make them believe 
that destroying is preferable to building.
We do not expect that the effects of the recent unrest will 
disappear in the near future. But we can reasonably hope that 
sons of the homeland will not forget any time soon the abomi-
nable reasons behind the unrest, so that they remain vigilant not 
to fall into similar predicaments in the future. Let us hope that 
they have come to value the welfare of their homeland over the 
fulfillment of harmful and perverted desires and over the lust of 
those who led and drove them toward that deep-seated hatred 
and dreadful demise.
Another gain is the growing conviction of our compatriots 
among others that those despicable wars and terrible atrocities 
were the logical consequences of irreligious and uncivilized 
proclivities. Without reforming their ways, they will likely fall 
deeper into misery, and not recover from their downfall. As long 
as our people do not distinguish between religion, which is nec-
essarily an intimate matter between the believer and his  Creator, 
and civic affairs, which govern and shape social and political 
relations between the human being and their fellow countrymen 
or between them and their government, as long as our people do 
not draw a sharp line to separate these two distinct concepts, 
they will fail to live up to what they preach or practice.
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Moreover, as long as our compatriots do not open the doors 
of knowledge and industry and encourage their dissemination 
among their elites and commoners alike, they should expect 
neither to join civilized peoples nor to be respected in the eyes 
of others, or—for that matter—in the eyes of one another. 
Nor should they presume that the doors to high office in the 
Ottoman government are open to them. For even though the 
Arabs were leaders and office holders of the highest reputation 
in times past, there is no hope in their advancement to anything 
higher than a scribe, dragoman, council member, or anything 
similar if they remain in their current condition.
Were our government to adopt a system like that of the 
 Chinese empire, for example, where government positions are 
restricted to those who are qualified, master the language of 
their country, and are experts in the laws and organizations of 
the empire, God knows how many office holders would keep 
their current positions. Any reasonable person knows how 
much this country and its people as a whole would gain from 
the establishment of a meritocratic system akin to the Chinese 
one. May we see such a system come to being by founding a 
public college, which would to facilitate the creation of a merit-
based bureaucracy, so that both improved education and better 
government may be counted among the moral gains of the 
homeland.2
For we strongly hope that in the future our compatriots will 
give culture, morals, and industry their due consideration and 
expand them among not just men but also women. For the 
 latter are the mothers of the land whose civilization is the 
greatest blessing and a  precondition for our country’s success 
and for the success of its people.  Conversely, keeping women 
uncivilized is one of the greatest curses for the homeland.3
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Let us also hope that in the future our compatriots will not 
look at themselves through the lens of sect or race but in terms of 
merit, virtue, and patriotic brotherhood. Such differences ought 
not lead to hate, envy, and alienation among our compatriot’s dif-
ferent communities any more than differences in personal appear-
ance, natural inclinations, clothes, and daily ways of living invoke 
envy and dislike among individuals. May they use this diversity, 
instead, as a means to awaken feelings of healthy competition, 
enthusiasm, conscientiousness, and kindness. Anyone who com-
pares regions where differences exist to where they do not knows 
that these healthy feelings are often the outcome of such diver-
sity. Those who have observed the matter closely recognize that 
when political authority was absent or weak, this diversity has 
often managed to sustain the cultural strength that prevented 
further unrest before or while it occurred.
Whoever does not consider this diversity carefully will inev-
itably wonder why it took so long for the current unrest to erupt 
rather than be surprised by it. Let us assume the impossible sce-
nario that, ceteris paribus, all Syrians belong to a single group or 
nation, whether Muslim or Christian. Would this have been a 
sufficient guarantee to prevent unrest and foreign intervention? 
Anyone with a sound opinion and the faintest knowledge about 
peoples’ histories and Syria’s more recent history cannot help 
but arrive at the firm conclusion that the decline would have 
been worse, the destruction even more widespread and terrible, 
and the danger much graver and uglier.
Another gain of the unrest is that our compatriots have come 
to realize that they are not alone in the world. They constitute a 
central rather than peripheral ring in a global chain. This ring 
holds a highly significant political and religious meaning. 
Our ring both connects and separates East and West and as such 
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exists in difficult circumstances. Today, with advancements like 
the telegram and steamships, the rings of this great chain have 
drawn much closer to one another and become more interdepen-
dent. Therefore, unless they wish to face humiliation, defeat, and 
hatred, it is the duty of all those who were destined to be the 
intermediaries—such as the Syrians—to avoid provoking their 
neighbors and to be a steady and cooperative link in this world-
wide chain. In this case, the loss will be theirs and no one else’s.
Another gain is the realization among intelligent, honorable, 
and wealthy countrymen that blame, loss, and responsibility 
ultimately rest with them. They should realize that it is in their 
best interest to know their limits and to diligently keep the 
ignorant at bay through education. To promote peace, concord, 
and amicability by example and instruction will help overcome 
their opposites. If the wise among Syrians had accounted for the 
consequences of deeds and realized sooner that developments 
would lead to the current unrest’s far-reaching effect, then they 
might have expelled the first obsessive whisper that the devil or 
those with ulterior motives instilled in their minds. They could 
have immediately smothered the first spark hurled into Syria’s 
parched forests and barren slopes by an ignorant fool or a sly 
conniver. Even if they could not have managed to extinguish the 
fire, at least they would have immediately abandoned the thick 
of war and its foolish proponents. That way, they would have 
proven to the world that they had no hand in these atrocities and 
barbaric acts and that they did not approve of them, and that 
they occurred against both their disposition and their will.
What could the commoners, whose most conspicuous char-
acteristic is ignorance, have done without someone supplying 
them with money, logistics, and the tools of war? What can one 
ask of people who are mere instruments in the hands of those in 
power and who are led by their notables, even against their own 
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interests, assuming that they know what their interests are? 
It follows that demanding collective punishment for all those 
who took part in the unrest is no better than blanket impunity. 
Both are extreme measures, neither religiously nor politically 
permissible. The former would amount to an act of barbarity, as 
the entire country would be cleansed of most of its men, given 
that very few did not participate in one way or another in these 
events. The latter, meanwhile, would entail the survival of those 
who are the virus of corruption and the roots of unrest. Setting 
those people free would boost the morale of evildoers and would 
expose the country to the perils of falling again into unrest 
instigated by them.
Another gain is that our fellow countrymen have become 
persuaded in a tangible way that governance is not only the salt 
but the very life of the Earth, and that laws exist to constrain 
evildoers and troubled souls. For lack of governance and the dis-
respect for the law are two of the worst evils to befall a country, 
whatever the degree of civilization and success the country has 
enjoyed. This is because governance and laws are like good 
health; their worth is only appreciated in their absence.
We hope that, given Syria’s pivotal position in the world and 
the various interests of foreigners in it, Syrians have been per-
suaded that their transgression of the boundaries of moderation 
and humanity incurs the blame of the entire world and necessi-
tates foreign intervention. Foreign political intervention may 
temporarily benefit some individuals, but we strongly believe 
that it is harmful to all countries. In a country like this one that 
is home to different races, rife with rooted differences and 
opposing views regarding foreign intervention, the latter is 
especially harmful given the different political and religious 
interests of the intervening powers. However, we maintain that, 
this time around, the intervention was beneficial to all groups 
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and absolutely necessary to put an end to the spread of unrest 
and destruction. Both were like an infectious disease spreading 
with determination and speed from one place to another. We 
wish that this intervention had taken place earlier or produced 
its desired effect before things got out of hand and the destruc-
tion became so widespread.
The entire Syrian people are indebted to these foreign hands. 
The latter lent support to their trusted counterparts of the 
 Ottoman state and to the honest among its soldiers, in order to 
put an end to the unrest and restrain the evildoers behind it who 
disobeyed God and their rightful rulers. We hope that this 
 foreign assistance, contingent on serving Syria’s interest, will 
continue until the fundamentals of justice and security are irre-
vocably established and until there is no more reason to fear the 
aggression, betrayal, and unrest committed by the connivers 
and their lowly and savage allies in the population.
We also hope that those countrymen who have become civi-
lized will not turn their faces away haughtily from their breth-
ren and alienate themselves in their own country. That is not an 
act of brotherly patriotism; it bodes ill for the country and hence 
for our fellow countrymen, particularly for their offspring. 
Rather, the civilized need to work tirelessly toward the benefit 
of the homeland and its children, even if they do not immedi-
ately reap the fruits of their endeavors and their sacrifices.
Countrymen,
The year 1860 has passed by with all its great incidents and its 
mystifying turbulences that affected these lands and the rest of 
the world. In its stead, we welcome the arrival of a new political 
year and hope that it will be one of comfort, affluence, and secu-
rity in Syria and for its people. Given the calamities that shook 
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the world last year, we cannot but hope that the fallout does not 
last beyond the end of this year. May the latter be a better one 
marked by rebuilding and peacefulness.
To fulfill these hopes, we have to remind our compatriots of 
two important issues. First, healing their country and fixing 
their lot depend on unity and personal diligence. This is because 
depending on others is like a hungry man who thinks his hunger 
will subside when his friend or his lord eats, or like an ignorant 
man who relies on the education of his neighbor or coreligionist 
to become a philosopher. For whoever cannot stand on their 
own cannot rely on anyone to prop them up.
Second, showing hatred toward the whole of society based on 
the sins that some of its members committed either consciously 
or carelessly is not only unfair but also harmful, as it prevents 
the very unity and concord upon which the success of the peo-
ple and the country depends. We hardly need to remind our 
countrymen that regret and remorse should be met with the 
spirit of forgiveness. This can bring hearts closer together and 
help restore concord. This is what the good neighbor and the 
true brother seek in our homeland; without concord success is 
elusive for neighbors and brothers even though their personal 
and professional interests are so intertwined.
May God guide the leaders and decision makers toward the 
good of everyone and the comfort of the public, and may He 




ch a p t e r 15
Clarion 10
February 22, 18611
More on the Moral Gains of the Homeland
Countrymen,
One of the moral gains of the homeland that resulted from the 
recent unrest is becoming aware of many issues. First of all, 
the rulers realize they need to attend more closely to their reign 
in order to be able to anticipate problems before they occur and 
not to neglect them lest they become too overwhelming to solve. 
Had the initial perpetrator of the crime been punished, or the 
landed tax farmer or district officer where the first murder had 
taken place been held responsible, it would have served as a 
 lesson and deterrent for others. Such actions would have been 
one of the best ways to end incitement before it spread and 
 deepened. However, if no one is held accountable for the  murders 
or if the murderer falls into the hands of authorities and they 
dismiss the case through money, reconciliation, or  temporary 
imprisonment, then life becomes expendable and bloodletting 
inconsequential for those with evil and corrupt intentions. 
They would commit more crimes and atrocities; matters would 
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only get worse until the entire the country and its people are 
once again ruined.
Second, rulers and governors need to be faithful to the state, 
the country, and the people. These rulers must be qualified and 
strong-willed; they must be capable personally and militarily to 
impose legislations and discipline on the wrongdoers, while steer-
ing clear of sowing the kind of divisions through their action that 
have been handed down from darker ages. Of course, agitators and 
corrupt hoodlums exist in every age, period, and country. But it 
saddens us to say that the permissiveness and extreme lenience on 
the part of the government in our country have increased their 
numbers in the hinterland. Their existence prevents the country 
from enjoying a sense of ease, security, and success.
Third, the will of the sultan and his sublime authority needs 
to be carried out. Ottoman subjects in all communities ought to 
give him his due respect on religious and political grounds. 
They should not challenge him, nor should any official of any 
rank dodge or ignore implementing his eminent ordinances. It is 
no secret that the imperial decrees that are issued by him, whom 
God has granted the throne of the sultanate, are intended for 
the comfort of the people, the prosperity of their livelihood, and 
the security of their income. If his decrees were tailored to the 
various whims and prejudices of local officials, they would lose 
their binding sense for some and imply preferential treatment 
for others. This is why either imperial decrees should be totally 
revoked in the same way they were promulgated, i.e., publicly, 
or they should be applied in full to reflect the letter of their issu-
er’s will. The former hypothetical revocation is impossible; the 
latter is a duty and a necessity. For anyone who is not blinded by 
prejudice and deafened by fanaticism is aware that half-hearted 
implementation of the decrees will shake the foundations of the 
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law, confuse the people, foster disagreement among them, and 
obstruct their commercial and other transactions. It will simply 
place everyone in a state of suspicion or illusion.
Fourth, authority needs to be delegated based on merit and 
qualification, not on nationality or family lineage, wealth or 
high social status. In today’s world, the most successful and pro-
gressive empires are those that observe this principle, which 
applies to spiritual as well as political office. The reason is this: 
anyone who counts on being promoted to higher ranks by virtue 
of birthright or by belonging to a certain race, tribe, or lineage 
that rose to a privileged status thanks to fate, the ignorance of 
past generations, or the activity and toil of its founding father is 
unlikely to exert the efforts necessary for the evolution and 
progress of those who do not yet enjoy the honorable privilege 
he forged for himself.
This is especially the case if they belong to the fourth gen-
eration or thereafter of a noble lineage. Being so distant from 
the founder of a family’s glory, their attributes lag far behind 
those of their forefathers—much as an imitator lags behind an 
inventor. They also lose and belittle the traits necessary to pre-
serve his and their glory because they succumb to the illusion 
that what their forebears built was not the fruit of long and hard 
work but, rather, some self-evident reality. It follows that latter 
generations become aloof. They develop a sense of scorn toward 
others and entitlement over them with little regard to their wel-
fare. If it so happened that some of the founder’s qualities are 
still in them, they would be in a state of decline and degenera-
tion.2 They would not be worthy of the position they hold, nor 
could they rise to their tasks. It is one’s heart and speech, not 
origin, that determines one’s worth. Would it not be ideal if one 
possessed both, merit and noble descent?
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Fifth, it is necessary to erect a barrier between leadership or 
spiritual authority, on the one hand, and politics or civil author-
ity, on the other. This is because the former is linked—by itself 
and by nature—to interior and fixed matters that do not change 
with time and circumstance, whereas the latter is related to 
external matters that are not fixed but can change and be 
reformed depending on place, time, and circumstance. The two 
are distinct and incompatible. It is well nay impossible to recon-
cile both in one person. Without separating both types of 
authority, it is no exaggeration to say that no civilization can 
exist, live, or grow.
Given their distinct and contradictory spheres of action, 
combining both can lead to many negative consequences. It will 
harm and undermine religious creeds as well as political delib-
erations. Each authority would annul the other’s effects and 
benefits, which, when applied correctly, would supply the best 
means to serve the intended recipient of both authorities, that 
is, their shared subject: the human being on the inside in rela-
tion to religion and on the outside in relation to politics. 
Combining both authorities can also encourage many to pursue 
spiritual office not out of love but out of greed for the temporal 
privileges, civil authority, and sway that the position undeserv-
edly bestows on them. Conversely, matters of political nature 
could be handed over to those whose temperaments are ill 
suited or who were not educated to handle such tasks. 
 Politicians need to be aware of the specificities of their 
 surroundings and the concrete laws governing them. Spiritual 
leaders, by contrast, are trained in meditation of the mind and 
abstract judgment, which are necessarily removed from the 
specific circumstances of a certain object, an individual, a gen-
eration, a nation, or type of people.
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Since politics has a strong hold on the self and its tempera-
ment, it can distract these people from performing the duties 
ordained by their spiritual office. Spiritual duties are in them-
selves sublime; they are more virtuous, important, and  honorable 
since they are directed toward the better part of the human 
being, the inner self. The dereliction of their ordained duty 
results in the people’s loss of faith in religion. They start acting 
like sheep without a shepherd. They refrain from honing their 
political craftsmanship and rely instead on the judgment of their 
spiritual leaders. These leaders only seem to agree to disagree, 
and if they happen to agree, their agreement is only at face 
value, short-lived, and inconsequential. This is how differences 
between their leaders become essential and then eternally 
entrenched among the people. We do not single out leaders of a 
specific sect. Rather we speak of the leaders of all the many sects 
of our country: Muslims, Christians, Druze, Aʿlawis, Ismaʿ ilis, 
Yazidis, Jews, and Samaritans, not to mention their various 
schools of thought and their offshoots.
Civilized countries have long realized the damage resulting 
from combining the two authorities. They have drawn a clear 
line between the spiritual and political realms, not allowing the 
one to interfere in the interests of the other. The stronger the 
separation, the greater the success and peace of mind. There is 
no doubt that this separation should also please legitimate spiri-
tual leaders. It relieves them of many temporal burdens and 
from their pangs of conscience since political preoccupation 
unavoidably leads to negligence of the spiritual duties to which 
they dedicated their lives and teachings. Now, should this sepa-
ration and the measures it entails be carried out gradually or 
abruptly? That depends not only on place, time, existing mood, 
and circumstance, but also on the informed opinion and the 
judicious will of those entitled to rule.
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Sixth, it is necessary to take strong, effective measures to 
completely secure people’s most cherished goods, as well as 
their trade, skills, and knowledge. Whoever compares the suc-
cessful cultivation of the many fertile plains in Syria with its 
rocky and hard-to-plough mountains realizes the virtue of 
security. It makes all the difference as to whether a fertile plain 
turns arid or fertile. And whoever compares Syria’s current ratio 
of harvests to population to that of ancient times will notice that 
its productivity, the wealth of its people, and its government can 
be increased manifold based on its natural resources. Given the 
current security deficit, the impoverishment of the people, and 
the injustices of the governors and local rulers, today’s  unusually 
low agricultural production is no surprise.
Eighth [sic], rulers and regional governors need to look after 
their subjects, and care for the worthy among them. They need 
to maintain their subjects’ comfort, well-being, and professional 
success. There is no doubt that this conduct will increase the 
love and trust that subjects hold toward their rulers. It will also 
convince the subjects not to place their commerce and interests 
under foreign control and protection. All of this is more obvious 
than a fire on a hilltop.
Countrymen,
We have thus enumerated the moral gains even though we 
and other compatriots wish they had not come at such cost and 
damage to the homeland. There are many other gains we did 
not dwell on because they either were referred to previously, or 
are self-evident, or are related to the future, which makes them 
near impossible to anticipate or predict. Despite the ongoing 
trepidation, unrest, and fragmentation, we still hope that these 
thick clouds will be followed, God willing, by ample rain and 
bountiful harvests. Through the perseverance of its guardians, 
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a new era will dawn upon Syria. Signs of this age and its advanc-
ing armies can be discerned from the imminent opening of the 
carriage way, the introduction of railway lines, and the expan-
sion of schools and hospitals.3
How we wish to see our compatriots, spiritual leaders, and 
political rulers compete constructively to contribute to these 
works! We believe that they are capable of it. Moreover, we wish 
that foreigners, who want to contribute to the welfare of the 
country rather than their own self-interest, follow the example 
of those who know best about this country and its people and 
thereby teach the countrymen in the language of the country. 
Using Arabic as a language of instruction benefits the language 
itself. On the one hand it makes the educated more productive 
and compassionate toward their country, on the other it makes 
them more acceptable to their fellow countrymen. Those who 
claim it is not possible to advance on the ladder of civilization 
using the Arabic language may not realize the merits of this lan-
guage. Its reform is more feasible and effective than the attempt 
to civilize Arabs using various foreign languages. Otherwise, we 
will have to accept regretfully and gloomily that Syria is also 
bound to become the Babel of languages, customs, and ideolo-
gies on top of being the Babel of religions, races, and confessions 
that it already is.
Countrymen,
You have been well known for generosity, gallantry, zeal, 
alertness, chivalry, and tolerance. You are now riding the wave 
of the nineteenth century’s generation of knowledge and illumi-
nation, of invention and discovery, of culture and learning, of 
arts and crafts, of progress and civilization.4 Do not let those 
intense seditious acts of civil war lead you away from these good 
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traits of yours. Rather, you should rise up, be aware and awake, 
and roll up your sleeves of verve and vigor.
Behold morals and civilization, means of unity and concord 
hailing from every direction crowding your doors, knocking 
with might and urgency, demanding entry into your adorned 
and coveted cities, your proud mountains, your valleys, deserts, 
and plains, which nature has so beautifully arranged with all its 
pleasant ornaments and dazzling power. So rid yourselves of 
your religious fanaticisms, confessional factionalism, sectarian 
enmities, and selfish prejudices! Open the gates to such noble 
guests like morals and civilization. Welcome them, extend them 
a united hand to shake, and accept them with delight and joy. It 
will fill your country with comfort, prosperity, and peace and 
cover your quarters with happiness, elegance, and pride.
From a patriot
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We have touched upon the issue of civilization many times in 
our previous pamphlets. Since many people of this generation 
are preoccupied with this topic, and since the spirit of the age is 
strongly inclined toward seeking it, and reaping its fruits, many 
are in danger of falling victim to false assumptions about the 
concept. They tend to mistake fake as well as traditional forms 
of civilization for the real thing. They remain content with the 
former as opposed to pursuing the latter, having convinced 
themselves that they maintain a firm grip on it. In reality, they 
are still very far from it. Therefore, we have decided to explain 
to our compatriots briefly what civilization is and how it 
is attained.
Let us not delve into its benefits and pleasures for now. 
There is no time, and no need given the overwhelming  tendency 
to believe in its enjoyments. Instead, we will argue the  following: 
Civilization originally comes from the word city. This derivation 
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can either be based on the distinction between city and nomadic 
desert or village and countryside. In the first instance, civiliza-
tion refers to the lifestyle of sedentary people as opposed to the 
lifestyle of nomads, who know no civilization. In the second 
instance, its contradistinction to the village refers to the city’s 
comfortable lifestyle, architectural order, and the like, which 
city dwellers erroneously claim are absent in the countryside 
among peasants and villagers.2
The concept of civilization has been expanded since then to 
mean inward and outward cultivation of the self and the attain-
ment of knowledge, culture, and virtue. It is no secret that in 
this world man is in one of two states: one of wilderness and bar-
barity, or one of civilization and grace. The state of barrenness is 
the natural state into which man is born. If he stays in it, there is 
little difference between him and dumb animals and the dam-
age he causes would be greater than that of animals. As for the 
state of civilization, it is a consequence of the gradual cultiva-
tion in manners and morals through emulation, hard work, and 
diligence. Only those with a proclivity toward these attributes 
reach their highest form.
The relation of wild humans to civilized humans is often pre-
sented as the relation of the ignorant to the wise, the animal to 
the human, darkness to light, and the blind to the seeing. It 
appears like the relation of monstrous flesh-eaters in distant 
Africa to the notables and dignitaries of Paris and England or 
the relation of desert Arabs to those living in Beirut. But con-
trary to such representations, civilization can be superficial and 
fake when based on the imitation and appropriation of certain 
foreign characteristics, customs, and habits rather than on fun-
damental, real, and contemporary principles. The bearer of this 
type of civilization resembles a drum—great in size and sound 
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but hollow on the inside and totally unusable after the slightest 
damage. His relation to true civilization is like a shadow’s rela-
tion to a body, or illusion’s relation to reality. As for true civili-
zation, in a nutshell, it is that universal state of society that suits 
the development of all the forces of the human race, individu-
ally and collectively.
Civilization is, therefore, not confined to a single thing or to 
particular forms of knowledge among the populace, such as sci-
ences or trades, for example. Rather, its essential end being 
development, it includes all sorts of affairs organized in a social 
structure. Subject to certain connections, civilization starts with 
the human being’s inner self and then extends outward. The 
primary objective of civilization is growth. For the success of 
humans does not rest on the accumulation of personal wealth—
whatever this wealth may be. Instead, it rests on the growth and 
expansion of their faculties and their appropriate use according 
to the original purpose for which they were meant. Humans 
were not created in the form of a sponge that absorbs all it can 
from the world’s material wealth but, rather, in the image of an 
ever-growing, fruit-bearing tree. Nor do their success, virtue, 
and happiness rest on the wealth and knowledge they have accu-
mulated and acquired for themselves. Instead, it rests on the 
useful deeds they can bring to bear on society. As the poet says:
Whoever does no good in someone else’s name
To me, his presence or absence is the same.
Based on the previous definition, it is clear that the mission and 
meaning of true civilization remain incomplete if they do not 
aid in the overall development and progress, both materially 
and morally, of humans. This is because the nurture of one’s 
body alone reduces him to an animal; the nurture of body and 
mind less the morals reduces him to the devil incarnate; and the 
Clarion 11 / 125
nurture of mind alone makes of him a possible contributor to 
world ruin and the total fading out of the human race. True civi-
lization, then, looks at each of those forces—body, mind, and 
culture—with a balanced perspective and gives them their 
appropriate attention according to their relative standing and 
virtue. This is to be done by rewarding the most virtuous with 
virtue and the most vicious with vice, both collectively and 
individually. We say so for the following reasons.
First, true civilization elevates a people by elevating each 
member one by one—men as well as women. Second, true civi-
lization is not concerned with one segment of the populace to 
the exclusion of another but places everyone on an equal foot-
ing. Now, if we compare the previous definition of civilization 
to how it was practiced by Greeks, Romans, and Arabs of past 
generations, we observe two shortcomings: these civilizations 
did not cultivate all the different aspects of the individual, and 
civilization was not present among all its peoples. It was like a 
house without a roof or a vault without the pivotal stone. It was 
hence of little use, short-lived, and with meager benefits for 
current generations.
Likewise, if we examine Europe’s current civilization in light 
of this definition, we see that it is lacking in many ways. Many 
bearers of progress there seek their own private good, and guard 
their power and privilege more than they care for the develop-
ment of knowledge and culture among their people. Thus, we 
see over there knowledge, kindness, and discipline next to igno-
rance, vulgarity, cruelty, drunkenness, and excessive self-love, 
not to mention obscene customs. For regardless of how eminent 
and glamorous a given civilization appears, only adhering to the 
healthy principles of common sense will put it on the right path. 
Otherwise its existence will be troubled and short, and its sway 
weak and poor.
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As for Syria, we were proud that before last year’s unrest, the 
country had set its left foot on the first step of the ladder of civi-
lization. We were hopeful that it would, in a short time, reach 
the highest echelons. As for now, we have no other recourse than 
to cover our mouth with our hands and await what future days 
and God’s Providence hold in store for us.
Countrymen,
Anything precious in this life is susceptible to imitation and 
forgery. The more precious and desired it is, the more efforts 
forgers make to reproduce a copy and present it to the public 
as genuine. The same way commodities, foodstuffs, and 
 medicine are forged, so, too, is the precious and sought-after 
commodity that is civilization. We see our present generation 
in clear danger of adopting, for various reasons, a brand of civ-
ilization that  neither merits the name nor bears the fruits of 
true civilization. This generation is so heavily dependent on 
this fake form that we fear that it may become too content with 
it, thereby stalling success.
Westerners have collectively attained great levels of civiliza-
tion, higher than that achieved by Easterners, including the 
children of these lands that, in times passed, produced the cra-
dle of civilization, centers of knowledge and glamour. It is thus 
feared that many of our compatriots who are more inclined 
toward imitation and more capable of it will be content with 
mimicking Western customs, clothes, and traits. For everything 
foreign is enjoyable and everything new is alluring, and our era 
is dominated by the West, whose customs and taste hold more 
sway than those of the East. Those who engage in such mimicry 
are under the illusion that their conduct suffices to mark them as 
civilized and to have them regarded in higher esteem than their 
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own kin and countrymen. What they are oblivious to is that 
such imitation makes them strangers in the eyes of their compa-
triots and despicable imposters of customs, unworthy of the 
clothes they wear, in the eyes of foreigners.
Like any reasonable person, we would not dispute that acquir-
ing good qualities from wherever in the world is desirable, or 
that many of the benefits of civilization come from the West and 
many people of Europe deserve full respect. We nevertheless 
cannot blindly take for granted that everything coming to us 
from there is in itself useful and compatible with the good prog-
ress of Easterners, who, like all people, are fundamentally shaped 
by their country’s atmosphere. Those who are willing to clutch 
at anything that comes their way from Europe without precise 
examination, sound criticism, and the strict selection of what is 
useful in terms of progress and refinement on par with Western-
ers are fooling themselves. They do not distinguish much 
between a forged dirham and a genuine dinar. They are patching 
up worn clothes with new rags. That is how people are.
It is no secret that anyone who shuns anything Western solely 
for being Western and applauds anything Arab solely for being 
Arab, or vice versa, falls into harmful extremism. People are 
naturally more inclined toward exterior rather than inner mat-
ters. They clutch more at appearance than at essence—espe-
cially regarding things like science and religion that require 
intensity of thought, prudent contemplation, and sharp inquiry. 
People apply themselves to the matter of civilization in a similar 
manner. They think that civilization is based on lifestyle, the 
way houses are laid out, how exquisite clothes are, eating at a 
table, making polite conversation, mixing of women and men, 
the acquisition of a foreign language, and the like. Overall, these 
practices have no benefit other than damage to people’s character 
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and personal virtues that set them apart as members of a notable 
and chosen community. In fact, such matters are the mere leaves 
or the bark of civilization. They are the most immaterial out-
comes and least useful benefits. They are foreign fruits sus-
pended temporarily on the tail end of the tree of civilization. As 
a poet once said:
Do not be impressed by a man’s attire.
About his manners you must inquire!
Were it not for the fragrance a branch emits
The difference between branches and firewood would not exist.
Countrymen,
Many means of civilization have been elucidated in previous 
pamphlets. Some are more important than others. The first of 
those is religion. We do not mean any religion. Rather, we mean 
true religion as revealed from God. True religion is the  foundation 
of true civilization. The freer this religion is from impurities 
bound to seep into every aspect of people’s lives, the purer the 
civilization that results from it is. Furthermore, any religion that 
holds ignorance as the father of faith and stupidity as the mother 
of piety cannot serve as a sound foundation for civilization.
The second is political authority. We do not mean any type 
of authority. Rather, our reference is to government concerned 
with the welfare of its subjects, their prosperity, their profes-
sional success, and their progress in knowledge, wealth, and civ-
ilization. In this sense political authority becomes a model that 
offers strong and effective measures to spread civilization among 
them. Whoever has noticed the strong connection and relation-
ship between government and subjects will agree with us that 
no civilized people survive under uncivilized rule. Conversely, 
no civilized rule is possible over an uncivilized people because 
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the two are intertwined. How true rings the adage “You get the 
government you deserve.”
The third is the means of acquiring cultural morals, such as 
schools, printing houses, newspapers, commerce, and the like, 
which bring people closer together like one family. Whatever the 
means to civilization, it is agreed upon that individuals and 
 peoples acquire it gradually rather than in one fell swoop. 
The easier it is for the people to access these means and the 
more widespread they are among its elites and commoners, the 
stronger, faster, firmer, and more practical civilization becomes.
Countrymen,
We believe that two factors, frequently mentioned in our pre-
vious patriotic tracts, are essential today to civilizing our com-
patriots: The first one is concord among them as individuals and 
groups. This is especially the case regarding civic concord, 
whose existence or lack thereof depend more on the strength, 
activity, and will power of authorities than on the whims of 
ordinary people and their various biases. As for heartfelt reli-
gious concord, it surprises us little that it has become difficult, if 
not impossible, to attain after what happened and given the fatal 
stagnation that has gripped our homeland’s religions and laws.
The second factor is love of the homeland in general, and 
placing its interest ahead of selfish ones, whether personal or 
sectarian, in particular. As long as our compatriots do not feel 
that this is their homeland and their country, there is no hope 
that they love it or care for its welfare. Rather, they would always 
be disunited, each one seeking what they imagine is useful to 
them or to their faction.
It is well known that any house or piece of property that is 
divided is doomed for destruction. Therefore, relying on the 
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wishes and opinions of Syrians to fix the situation in the country 
is like asking for the impossible or like expecting the sick and 
the guilty to heal and judge themselves. Even if we were to 
acknowledge that Syrians know their own good, we cannot 
assume that they all agree on it. Furthermore, if they decided to 
agree, there is little hope that they will be allowed to enjoy it. 
Hence, this country is heading in an extremely dangerous direc-
tion. There is no hope for this country’s reconstruction or salva-
tion from ruin, unless God guides its people into the right 
direction, or, through His extraordinary providence, supplies 
effective and unprejudiced means to civilization, or at least puts 
it on the path to safety and success.
We cannot do anything now except bemoan this unfortunate 
country, a country that has become victim to such divergent 
prejudices and personal interests and home to so few patriots . . .
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6. For premodern occurrences and valances of watan, see  Haarmann 
2014; Antrim 2012; Noorani 2016; and Günther and Milich 2016.
7. Lewis 1991: 525–26.
8. Darling 2013; Boroujerdi 2013.
9. Khuri 1983: 22–23.
10. “vatanın muhafazı için.” Mufassal 1972: 2984. See also 
 Abu-Manneh 1994.
11. al-Tahtawi included a history of the July Revolution in the final 
draft of his Takhlis at the behest of a French friend (Newman 2004: 
84–85). According to Hourani (1983: 80–81), he translated the French 
revolutionary anthem. The Marseillaise’s first line, “Allons enfants 
de la Patrie,” may have echoed in Nafir Suriyya’s repeated dialogical 
invocations of abna al-watan—literally “the children of the homeland.” 
Interestingly, Napoleon III (r. 1852–70) adopted “Partant pour la Syrie” 
as the Second French Empire’s national anthem.
12. Newman (2004: 195–205). In an interesting slippage of the term 
that al-Tahtawi used for the revolution, al-fitna is rendered as al-thawra 
in R. Khuri’s (1943: 180) original study; and as “civil war” in the English 
translation, R. Khuri (1983: 106).
13. For example, in Takhlis, Tahtawi translates “republican govern-
ment” with hukm al-jumhuriyya and, for comparison, invokes the 1760s 
Hammam rebellion against the Mamluks in Upper Egypt as jumhuri-
yya iltizamiyya. See Newman (2004: 304). Conversely, Bustani invokes 
as a model of patriotic action the Antilyas Commune of 1840, whose 
leaders themselves invoked the French Revolution to stage a decisive 
uprising against the Egyptian occupation, in Nafir Suriyya 5 (Novem-
ber 1, 1860).
14. Tahtawi 1866, 1872–73.
15. Colla 2008: 121–36.
16. Hubb al-watan min al-iman was later emblazoned across the 
masthead of al-Jinan. It was the subject of an article in the journal’s 
first year (al-Jinan [1870]: 302–3), reproduced in al-Bustani 1990i: 77–78. 
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It was also the slogan of the francophone Young Ottoman newspaper 
Hürriyet, published in Paris in the 1860s.
17. The status of this hadith is contested among scholars. 
The  Baalbak-born Safavid polymath Baha al-Din al-ʿ Amili (1547–1621) 
already argued against a nostalgic territorial interpetation of the hadith 
and against a bodily ascription to the concept of watan.  Nevertheless, 
Iranian exiles in fin de siècle Istanbul rediscovered the power of this 
aphorism to express their homesickness. See Tavakoli-Targhi 1999: 115.
18. In the Islamic tradition, three principles have vied with one 
another over the meaning of al-iman: the Ashʿarite’s insistence on 
internal conviction, the Hanafi-Maturidi stress on verbal expres-
sion, and others, including the Muʿ tazilites, who prioritized the per-
formative element of faith. Throughout Islamic history scholars were 
divided over questions of free will and faith, the existence of degrees 
of faith, if it can be partial, increase, and decrease. See Gardet 2012.
19. On hubb al-watan in Nafir Suriyya, see also Sheehi 2004: 57.
20. Makdisi 2008a.
21. Ahmad Faris al-Shidyaq, “Jumal adabiyya,” republished in 
majali al-ghurar li-kuttab al-qarn al-tasiʿ ʿashar (Beirut, 1906), 189–91. 
Translated in Khuri 1983: 98–101.
22. Nafir Suriyya 4 (October 25, 1860).
23. Nafir Suriyya 6 (November 8, 1860). al-Raʿ iyya is a key concept for 
Islamic governmentality. See Darling 2013. For an early critique of the 
concept, see Adib Ishaq, “al-malik wa al-raʿ iyya,” Misr (1877) repub-
lished in Sufayr 1904: 92–95.
24. Zolondek 1965; Ayalon 1987: 50–52.
25. Nafir Suriyya 4 (October 25, 1860).
26. Bou Ali 2013: 270.
27. Aʿmil 1986, Firro 2002, Weiss 2010.
28. “Tawaʾ if al-naml,” third issue; and “tawaʾ if al-hayawanat hatta . . . 
duda al-qazz,” eighth issue.
29. al-gharadh appears at least ten times (al-aghradh another seven 
times) in Nafir Suriyya, especially in the fifth issue (“Syria is .  .  . the 
birthplace of .  .  . this wicked carnal principle .  .  . inherited from bar-
barians .  .  . that has left behind destruction and peril and squandered 
the land’s wealth and its families”); and in issues 9–11 (as the “selfish” 
antithesis of “the country’s welfare,” “true religion,” and “noble guests 
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like morals and civilization”). In Aʿbbasid poetry, the gharadh sec-
tion was the first part that conveyed the purpose of the subject of the 
poem. See Sajdi 2008: 186. For the linguists, al-gharadh is that for the 
sake of which the subject takes action and means (ʿillat al-ghayya). In al-
Bustani’s Muhit al-Muhit (1979: 656), the first definitions of al-gharadh are 
about eating and drinking and suggest gluttony. In a derivative sense 
al-gharad also means “being loyal to one’s faction.” See also Saqr 2008: 
21. El-Ariss (2013: 41) suggests that al-Tahtawi uses the term to express 
Mehmed Ali’s Pasha’s “desire” for military technology in his Takhlis.
30. Nafir Suriyya 3, 8, and 11.




1. The Ottoman special envoy to the crisis, Fu aʾd Pasha, had 
arrived in Beirut on August 8 and among his first acts was warn-
ing the Christians of Mount Lebanon “that it is not permissible for 
the subjects to take upon themselves the right of vengeance, as ven-
geance and punishment are the prerogatives of the government.” See 
Makdisi 2000b: 147. A week later six thousand French soldiers led by 
General Charles Beaufort d’Hautpoul—erstwhile French chief of staff 
during Ibrahim Pasha’s Syrian campaigns in the 1830s—disembarked 
“chanting the Crusaders song ‘Partons pour la Syrie.’ ” Almost thirty 
thousand Christian refugees from Damascus and the Beqaa flocked 
to Beirut requiring urgent relief. In early September, Fu aʾd Pasha 
issued dozens of summons on fugitive Druze leaders. The trial of the 
Ottoman governor of Saida, Hurshid Pasha, began September 17. On 
September 21, Saʿ id Bey Jumblat and ten other Druze chiefs turned 
themselves in, only to be given the death sentence. A day before this 
first issue of Nafir Suriyya, the members of the International Commis-
sion of Inquiry were selected.
2. Militarily, the Druze warring factions of Mount Lebanon 
defeated their Maronite counterparts, whose religious leadership, 
most historians of Lebanon agree, incited the violence that ensued.
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chapter 7
1. Three days earlier, on October 5, the first session of the  European 
Commission of Inquiry convened in Beirut. Maronite bishops started 
presenting lists of Druze perpetrators but the commission suspected 
that they “sought the political, as well as the physical, annihilation of 
their adversaries” (Farah 2000: 622).
2. For a full translation of the decree and Fu aʾd Pasha’s statements, 
see Abkarius 1920: 145–47.
3. Bustani refers to the biblical and Quranic (20:83) story of the 
Golden Calf: Impatient for the return of Moses from Mt. Sinai, 
the Israelites began to worship a golden calf. According to the Old 
Testament, Moses had three thousand male adults slain. A plague 
struck the tribe and God threatened to visit sin upon it: Exodus 
19:20—32:11.
4. This phrase alludes to Quranic verse: Sura al-Raʿ d 13:10–11.
chapter 9
1. The ring/chain metaphor recurs in the ninth of Nafir Suriyya, 
where Bustani places Syria in the center of a global chain, which has 
become ever more connected since the rise of modern means of com-
munication and transport.
2. The “right to life, honor, and prosperity” invokes the Ottoman 
Imperial Rescript of 1839.
3. This apocryphal hadith, popularized by Rifaʿ a al-Tahtawi in 
Egypt a generation earlier, was later to be the patriotic motto in al-
Bustani’s journal al-Jinan (1870–86). See chapter 5.
chapter 10
1. al-Bustani used qabaʾ il in pamphlet 3 in relation to bees. Bee 
activity appears in the Quran (16:68) as cause for reflection. Ibn Khal-
dun’s Muqaddima references the organization of bees to explain the 
royal authority system.
2. al-Bustani is referring to Ibrahim Pasha’s Egyptian occupation 
of Bilad al-Sham from 1831 to 1840.
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3. “Group of patriots” refers to the participants of the “Antilyas 
meeting”—a cross-confessional, anti-Egyptian uprising in the sum-
mer of 1840. For the proclamation text, see Rustum 1934: 102–3. See also 
Havemann 1983.
4. Qaysi-Yamani factionalism may have run through many parts 
of early modern Arab society but “it is only by the nineteenth cen-
tury that this phenomenon starts being mentioned as the predeces-
sor of the Yazbaki-Jumblati factionalism.” See Abu Husayn 1991: 40. 
For more on these putative origins and permutations, see part 1 of 
this book.
5. See chapter 5 on the semantic shift of al-jins in Arabic.
6. The Matn was a confessionally mixed district of Mt. Lebanon at 
the time where violence broke out in 1841 and again in 1860.
chapter 11
1. Or “to represent them adequately.” Tasawwaruha also connotes 
“to represent.” See Sacks 2015: 87.
2. The equivalent of around twenty-five million Ottoman piasters 
at the time.
3. The distinction between shepherds and flock represents the 
long-standing pastoral definition of the relationship between ruler and 
ruled in political advice literature. The Ottoman reforms  challenged 
this form of governmentality.
chapter 12
1. A list presented to the ninth session of the Commission on 
November 10, 1860, revealed that Fu aʾd Pasha had expended over one 
and a half million piasters on the reconstruction of houses and allo-
cated over two million piasters more toward the same end. See Farah 
2000: 633–34. Many refugees started emigrating abroad via Beirut. On 
November 17, Yusuf Karam was provisionally appointed Christian 
Qaimaqam in Kisrawan. He was to lead the last anti-Ottoman rebellion 
in Mt. Lebanon from 1864 to 1866.
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2. In other words, the loss of the homeland altogether is even 
graver then the loss of national harmony because the latter hardly 
existed before.
3. These are generic names often used in Arabic grammar books.
chapter 13
1. In early December 1860, Lord Dufferin tabled a plan for a unified 
Syria. On December 12, General Beaufort provocatively marched his 
troops from Beirut to Saida. See Fawaz 1994: 125.
2. The Epistle to Titus is included in the New Testament. The 
author is thought to be St. Paul (5–67 ad), who wrote the letter at 
the end of his life. It instructs a fictitious Titus in the proper Chris-
tian conduct toward Cretan society and how to set up Christian mis-
sions there. On Bustani’s solicitation of St. Paul, see Sacks 2015: 109–10. 
Bustani may do more than augment his scholarly credentials and ref-
erence a role-model Christian convert. In the context of discussing 
the Arabs confessing to lying, he also humors the play on deductive 
logic in the Cretan philosopher Epimenides’s famous paradox: “All 
Cretans are liars.”
3. Compare al-Bustani’s point and his convoluted way of express-
ing it with James S. Mill’s “II. Objection: That the People Are Not 
Capable of Acting Agreeably in Their Interest” in his Essay on Gov-
ernment: “One caution, first of all, we should take along with us, and 
it is this: that all those persons who hold the powers of government 
without having an identity of interests with the community, and all 
those persons who share in the profits which are made by the abuse 
of those powers, and all those persons whom the example and rep-
resentations of the first two classes influence, will be sure to repre-
sent the community, or a part having an identity of interest with the 
community, as incapable in the highest degree of acting according 
to their own interest with the community ought to hold the power 
of government no longer, if those who have that identity of inter-
est could be expected to act in any tolerable conformity with their 
interest” (Mill 1825: 29–30).
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chapter 14
1. On January 4, 1861, Fu aʾd Pasha commenced the Mukhtara trial 
of seven hundred to eight hundred arrested Druzes. At the twentieth 
session, on January 24, the guilty lists were haggled over.
2. al-Bustani seems to have thought about his national school proj-
ect as early as here. His al-madrasa al-wataniyya opened its doors two 
years later. See Hanssen 2005a.
3. Cf. Butrus al-Bustani, “Taʾlim al-nisaʾ ” (1848).
chapter 15
1. On February 7, the French position on death sentences soft-
ened. At the twenty-second session of the Commission on  February 
27, French consul Beclard agreed to pardon those condemned at 
Mukhtara but to execute “the Beirut Eleven.” At the twenty-third ses-
sion on February 28, Beclard consented to a stay of execution.  Jumblat’s 
guilt was discussed on March 2, the twenty-forth session, but he died 
of poor health on May 11, 1861, following seven months of incarceration.
2. Here, al-Bustani seems to be drawing on Ibn Khadun’s stages of 
the rise and decline of dynasties.
3. On the Beirut-Damascus Road and other infrastructural devel-
opments, see Hanssen 2005b.
4. See Sheehi 2004: 57–61 for an elaboration on the metaphor of 
“the camel’s hump.”
chapter 16
1. On March 16, the convicted Druzes were sent to exile in Tripoli 
(Libya).
2. al-Bustani invokes the historical sociology of Ibn Khaldun.
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